{"title":"经验泛心理学:一个新的综合","authors":"Ben Schermbrucker","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.5.075","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"It is frequently claimed that panpsychism is unable in principle to generate evidence or predictions. After exploring how this impasse owes to panpsychism's commitment to brute physicalism, I argue that organismic panpsychism (OP) can retain this commitment and yet be empirical in principle.\n I then explore ways in which OP can be defended against a range of objections. These objections primarily relate to OP's metaphysics, its dependency on string theory, and its appeal to future states of science. Finally, OP's ability to avert a worrying consequence of Russellian panpsychism\n is discussed.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Empirical Panpsychism: A New Synthesis\",\"authors\":\"Ben Schermbrucker\",\"doi\":\"10.53765/20512201.30.5.075\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"It is frequently claimed that panpsychism is unable in principle to generate evidence or predictions. After exploring how this impasse owes to panpsychism's commitment to brute physicalism, I argue that organismic panpsychism (OP) can retain this commitment and yet be empirical in principle.\\n I then explore ways in which OP can be defended against a range of objections. These objections primarily relate to OP's metaphysics, its dependency on string theory, and its appeal to future states of science. Finally, OP's ability to avert a worrying consequence of Russellian panpsychism\\n is discussed.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47796,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Consciousness Studies\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Consciousness Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"102\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.5.075\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"心理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.5.075","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
It is frequently claimed that panpsychism is unable in principle to generate evidence or predictions. After exploring how this impasse owes to panpsychism's commitment to brute physicalism, I argue that organismic panpsychism (OP) can retain this commitment and yet be empirical in principle.
I then explore ways in which OP can be defended against a range of objections. These objections primarily relate to OP's metaphysics, its dependency on string theory, and its appeal to future states of science. Finally, OP's ability to avert a worrying consequence of Russellian panpsychism
is discussed.