受保护的理由和先例约束

IF 1.2 Q1 LAW Legal Theory Pub Date : 2020-03-01 DOI:10.1017/S1352325220000075
R. Mullins
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引用次数: 2

摘要

摘要根据先例的优先原因模型,从决策者需要将其决策与从过去案例中提取的已确定的优先顺序相协调的角度来解释先例约束。先例的优先理由模式背离了普通法规则包括受保护的诉讼理由的观点。在本文中,我证明了利用受保护理由的模型和先验约束的优先理由模型在重要意义上是等价的。然后,我对这一结果的哲学意义进行了一些思考。我认为受保护的理性模型与先验约束现象学是一致的。我建议对先例推理进行说明,以调和优先理性和受保护理性模型。
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PROTECTED REASONS AND PRECEDENTIAL CONSTRAINT
ABSTRACT According to the prioritized reason model of precedent, precedential constraint is explained in terms of the need for decision-makers to reconcile their decisions with a settled priority order extracted from past cases. The prioritized reason model of precedent departs from the view that common law rules comprise protected reasons for action. In this article I show that a model utilizing protected reasons and the prioritized reason model of precedential constraint are, in an important sense, equivalent. I then offer some reflections on the philosophical significance of this result. I argue that the protected reason model is consistent with the phenomenology of precedential constraint. I suggest an account of precedential reasoning that reconciles the prioritized reason and protected reason models.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
16.70%
发文量
15
期刊最新文献
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