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Administration as Democratic Trustee Representation 作为民主受托人代表的行政管理
IF 0.6 Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-01-26 DOI: 10.1017/s1352325223000204
Katharine Jackson
The “folk” theory of democracy that typically justifies the administrative state cannot help but lead to a discourse of constraint. If agency action is only legitimate when it mechanically applies the will of the voters as transposed by Congress through statutes, then the norms guiding that action will inevitably restrain agency discretion. As a result, attempts to establish the democratic credentials of the administrative state ironically obstruct the application of collective power. But this “folk” theory of democracy is bad theory. It is empirically incredible and, alarmingly, facilitates dangerous populist politics. Political theory instead suggests that a theory of democratic representation not only better explains legislative outcomes, but also deprives demagogues and deregulatory partisans of the fictions that prop up their agendas. After a brief survey of representative theory, this article will demonstrate that a model of trustee representation adequately describes administration, reinforces its democratic credentials and constitutes a space for politics in shaping the regulations that govern us all.
民主的 "民间 "理论是行政国家的典型理由,它不能不导致一种约束性的论述。如果机构的行动只有在机械地执行国会通过法规转达的选民意愿时才是合法的,那么指导该行动的规范将不可避免地限制机构的自由裁量权。因此,试图建立行政国家民主资质的努力具有讽刺意味地阻碍了集体权力的应用。但这种 "民间 "民主理论是糟糕的理论。它在经验上是不可思议的,而且令人震惊的是,它助长了危险的民粹主义政治。相反,政治理论认为,民主代议制理论不仅能更好地解释立法结果,还能使蛊惑人心者和放松管制的党派分子失去支撑其议程的虚构。在对代议制理论进行简要考察之后,本文将证明受托人代表制模式能够充分描述行政管理,增强其民主性,并在制定管理我们所有人的法规时为政治提供空间。
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引用次数: 0
Proportionality, Comparability, and Parity: A Discussion on the Rationality of Balancing 比例性、可比性和均等性:关于平衡合理性的讨论
IF 0.6 Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-01-25 DOI: 10.1017/s1352325223000186
Piero Ríos Carrillo
This article analyses the rationality of the principle of proportionality as a justificatory method for solving cases involving conflicts of constitutional principles. It addresses the “problem of comparability”: a set of arguments claiming that proportionalists fail to understand what happens when constitutional principles collide. The problem of comparability suggests that balancing cannot be done if some conflicts of constitutional principles are, in reality, cases of noncomparability, incommensurability, incomparability, or vagueness. In this article, I challenge the views of both proportionalists and their skeptics. Against the skeptics, I argue that proportionality can survive the challenge posed by the problem of comparability. Against the proportionalists, I submit that proportionality cannot be understood as a system of tradeoffs between degrees of satisfaction of principles. If comparison among constitutional principles is to be rational, we need a different approach to normativity—one that allows for the possibility of parity.
本文分析了比例原则作为解决宪法原则冲突案件的合理性。文章论述了 "可比性问题":这是一组声称比例论者未能理解宪法原则冲突时会发生什么的论点。可比性问题表明,如果某些宪法原则冲突实际上是不可比性、不可比性、不可比性或模糊性的情况,那么就无法进行平衡。在本文中,我对比例论者及其怀疑论者的观点都提出了质疑。针对怀疑论者的观点,我认为比例论可以经受住可比性问题的挑战。针对比例论者,我认为比例性不能被理解为原则满足程度之间的权衡体系。如果宪法原则之间的比较是合理的,我们就需要一种不同的规范性方法--一种允许平等可能性的方法。
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引用次数: 0
Neglecting Others and Making It Up to Them: The Idea of a Corrective Duty 忽视他人和补偿他人:矫正义务的理念
IF 0.6 Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-01-10 DOI: 10.1017/s1352325223000198
Giulio Fornaroli

I aspire to answer two questions regarding the concept of a corrective duty. The first concerns what it means to wrong others, thus triggering a demand for corrections (the ground question). The second relates to the proper content of corrective duties. I first illustrate how three prominent accounts of corrective duties—the Aristotelian model of correlativity, the Kantian idea that wronging corresponds to the violation of others’ right to freedom, and the more recent continuity view—have failed to answer the two questions satisfactorily. I then introduce my proposal, which holds that we wrong others when we fail to treat their status as moral agents as a source of stringent constraints on our action. I call it the moral neglect account. Once we have identified a common aim of corrective duties (counterbalancing moral neglect), we can fill their content in the various contexts in which wronging has occurred. I conclude by observing that it is not the primary role of corrective justice to assign responsibilities for damage reparations; in fact, requests for compensation make more sense if framed in distributive rather than corrective terms.

我希望回答有关纠正义务概念的两个问题。第一个问题涉及什么是 "误导他人",从而引发纠正要求(基础问题)。第二个问题涉及纠正义务的适当内容。我首先说明了三种关于矫正义务的著名观点--亚里士多德的相关性模式、康德关于不法行为相当于侵犯他人自由权的观点以及最近提出的连续性观点--是如何未能令人满意地回答这两个问题的。然后,我提出了我的建议,即当我们没有把他人作为道德主体的地位视为对我们行动的严格约束时,我们就会错误地对待他人。我称之为道德忽视说。一旦我们确定了纠正义务的共同目标(抵消道德忽视),我们就可以在发生不法行为的各种情况下填充其内容。最后,我想说的是,分配损害赔偿责任并不是矫正性正义的主要作用;事实上,如果从分配而不是矫正的角度来看,赔偿请求更有意义。
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引用次数: 0
The Promise and Limits of Grounding in Law 法律接地的希望与局限
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1017/s1352325223000149
Bosko Tripkovic, Dennis Patterson
Abstract Discussions of metaphysical grounding have recently found their way into general jurisprudence. It is becoming increasingly common to frame the debate between positivism and antipositivism as a disagreement about what facts metaphysically ground legal facts. In this article we critically evaluate this grounding turn. First, we argue that articulating the debate about the nature of law in terms of grounding holds the promise of recasting it in a common vocabulary. Second, we argue that this comes at a cost: framing the debate in this way obscures a range of further disagreements that cannot be usefully analyzed in terms of metaphysical grounding. We conclude that grounding may give us a clearer picture of what we already knew, while obfuscating a number of important questions to which it cannot, and is not intended to, provide answers.
关于形而上学基础的讨论最近进入了一般法理学。将实证主义和反实证主义之间的争论定义为关于哪些事实在形而上学上构成法律事实的分歧正变得越来越普遍。在本文中,我们批判性地评估这种接地转向。首先,我们认为,从基础的角度阐明关于法律本质的辩论,有希望用共同的词汇来重新表述它。其次,我们认为这是有代价的:以这种方式构建辩论模糊了一系列进一步的分歧,这些分歧无法从形而上学的角度进行有效的分析。我们的结论是,接地可以让我们更清楚地了解我们已经知道的东西,同时混淆了一些重要的问题,这些问题是它不能也不打算提供答案的。
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引用次数: 0
Precedent and Fairness 先例与公平
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1017/s1352325223000174
Adam Perry
Abstract Courts in common law systems decide cases as they decided like cases in the past—even if they believe they decided those past cases wrongly. What, if anything, justifies this practice? I defend two main claims. The first is that fairness favors treating like cases alike if that means treating them correctly. The second is that, in general, a court is as likely to decide an instant case correctly as it was to decide a previous and like case correctly. Together, these claims tell us that departing from and following precedent are equally likely to yield a correct decision, whereas following precedent may also yield a fair decision. Adhering to precedent is the dominant alternative, as a result. Fairness therefore justifies the practice of precedent. While this conclusion is not original, my argument for it is.
英美法系的法院判决案件的方式与过去类似——即使他们认为自己对过去的案件的判决是错误的。什么,如果有的话,证明这种做法是正当的?我为两个主要观点辩护。首先,如果公平意味着正确地对待同类案件,那么公平有利于一视同仁。第二,一般来说,法院正确判决当前案件的可能性与正确判决先前和类似案件的可能性是一样的。总之,这些说法告诉我们,背离先例和遵循先例同样可能产生正确的决定,而遵循先例也可能产生公平的决定。因此,遵循先例是主要的选择。因此,公平为先例的实践提供了理由。虽然这个结论不是原创的,但我的论点是原创的。
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引用次数: 0
LEG volume 29 issue 3 Cover and Front matter LEG第29卷第3期封面和封面问题
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1017/s1352325223000113
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.
此内容的摘要不可用,因此提供了预览。当您可以访问此内容时,可以通过“保存PDF”操作按钮获得完整的PDF。
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引用次数: 0
LEG volume 29 issue 3 Cover and Back matter LEG第29卷第3期封面和封底
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1017/s1352325223000125
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.
此内容的摘要不可用,因此提供了预览。当您可以访问此内容时,可以通过“保存PDF”操作按钮获得完整的PDF。
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引用次数: 0
The Exclusionary Power of Political Directives 政治指令的排他性权力
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1017/s1352325223000150
Yuan Yuan
Abstract I defend the exclusionary power of political directives. The prevailing account, which I call the additive account, holds that a legitimate directive only provides a pro tanto obligation for subjects to comply. I show that it falls into a Goldilocks dilemma, giving either insufficient or excessive weight to these obligations. Pace the additive account, I argue that a legitimate directive not only gives subjects a pro tanto reason to comply but also excludes all the reasons bearing on its justifiability regarding subjects’ actions as required by the directive. Unlike Raz, who grounds the exclusionary power of legitimate directives on authorities’ supposedly superior epistemic competence, I justify it by drawing on Kantian political philosophy, which grants states a unique moral standing to make coercive decisions on behalf of their citizenry as a solution to the problem of unilateralism.
摘要本文对政治指令的排他性进行了辩护。主流的解释,我称之为附加解释,认为一个合法的指令只提供了主体遵守的临时义务。我指出,它陷入了一个金发姑娘困境,对这些义务的重视要么不足,要么过度。与附加的解释相比,我认为一个合法的指令不仅给了主体一个服从的理由,而且还排除了所有与指令所要求的主体行为的正当性有关的理由。不像拉兹,他将合法指令的排他性权力建立在当局所谓的优越认知能力之上,我通过借鉴康德的政治哲学来证明这一点,康德的政治哲学赋予国家独特的道德地位,以代表其公民做出强制性决定,作为单边主义问题的解决方案。
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引用次数: 0
Rights, Abstraction, and Correlativity 权利、抽象和相关性
IF 0.6 Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-06-01 DOI: 10.1017/S135232522300006X
Julian David Jonker
Abstract I survey several counterexamples (by Raz and MacCormick) to Hohfeld's conjecture that a claim-right is correlative to a directed duty and (by Cornell and Frick) to Bentham's suggestion that a claim-right is correlative to a wronging. We can vindicate these claims of correlativity if we acknowledge that entitlements like claim-rights and directed duties admit of degrees of abstraction: that they may be general rather than specific, unspecified rather than specified, or indefinite rather than definite. I provide an error theory consisting in linguistic and practical reasons for why we articulate normative incidents in ways that threaten correlativity. And I deny that abstraction imposes a heavy metaphysical cost on rights theory, though I leave open whether abstraction excludes certain explanatory accounts of rights such as the interest theory or will theory.
摘要我调查了几个反例(Raz和MacCormick),以回应Hohfeld关于索赔权与定向义务相关的猜想,以及(Cornell和Frick)Bentham关于索赔权和不法行为相关的建议。如果我们承认索赔权和定向义务等权利具有抽象程度,我们就可以证明这些相关性:它们可能是一般的而不是具体的,可能是未指明的而不是特定的,也可能是不确定的而不是确定的。我提供了一个错误理论,包括语言和实践原因,解释为什么我们以威胁相关性的方式表达规范性事件。我否认抽象给权利理论带来了沉重的形而上学成本,尽管我不确定抽象是否排除了某些对权利的解释,如利益理论或意志理论。
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引用次数: 0
LEG volume 29 issue 2 Cover and Front matter LEG第29卷第2期封面和封面问题
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-06-01 DOI: 10.1017/s1352325223000095
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Legal Theory
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