首席执行官权力与ipo抑价:需求侧文化权力距离的影响研究

IF 5.7 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Global Strategy Journal Pub Date : 2021-10-11 DOI:10.1002/gsj.1422
Ryan Krause, Juanyi Chen, Garry D. Bruton, Igor Filatotchev
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引用次数: 6

摘要

首次公开募股(IPO)定价过低反映了早期投资者无法获得创业公司的全部价值。IPO公司可能会通过降低首席执行官(CEO)的权力来传递财富保护的信号,从而限制定价过低。不过,这种信号对许多IPO公司来说尤其具有挑战性,因为对于那些在权力距离高的文化中开展业务的公司来说,CEO权力也可能是创造财富的信号,这使得CEO权力对IPO投资者来说是一个好坏参半的信号。利用信号理论,我们认为CEO权力与IPO抑价呈正相关,但对于在文化权力距离高的国家开展业务的IPO公司,这种关系减弱,因为信息信号变得不那么清晰。然而,当承销商声誉提供替代信号时,CEO权力和需求方文化权力距离的信号影响减弱。本研究为IPO公司治理从业者(如企业家、风险投资家、承销商和监管机构)提供了新的知识。具体而言,我们的研究表明,高层的权力动态对需求方合法性或使美国上市公司对国际客户更具合法性具有影响。因此,那些反对CEO权力整合的股东和证券分析师应该考虑这样的权力整合在与国外市场相关的不同文化环境中竞争时可能给公司带来的潜在好处。
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Chief executive officer power and initial public offering underpricing: Examining the influence of demand-side cultural power distance

Research Summary

Initial public offering (IPO) underpricing reflects the inability of early investors to capture the full value of an entrepreneurial firm. IPO firms can potentially limit underpricing by signaling wealth protection through lower chief executive officer (CEO) power. Such signaling is particularly challenging for many IPO firms, though, because for those doing business in high-power-distance cultures, CEO power can also signal wealth creation, making CEO power a mixed signal for IPO investors. Drawing on signaling theory, we argue that CEO power is positively associated with IPO underpricing, but this relationship weakens for IPO firms doing business in countries with high cultural power distance because the information signaled becomes less clear. The signaling impact of both CEO power and demand-side cultural power distance weakens, however, when underwriter reputation offers a substitute signal.

Managerial Summary

This research offers new knowledge for IPO corporate governance practitioners, such as entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, underwriters, and regulators. Specifically, our research demonstrates that the power dynamic in the upper echelons has implications for demand-side legitimacy or making U.S.-listed firms more legitimate with international customers. As a result, stockholders and securities analysts who balk at the consolidation of CEO power should consider the potential benefits that such consolidation of power might grant the firm when competing in different cultural environments associated with foreign markets.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
14.20
自引率
11.80%
发文量
46
期刊介绍: The Global Strategy Journal is a premier platform dedicated to publishing highly influential managerially-oriented global strategy research worldwide. Covering themes such as international and global strategy, assembling the global enterprise, and strategic management, GSJ plays a vital role in advancing our understanding of global business dynamics.
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