Henrik Andersson, Per Engström, Katarina Nordblom, Susanna Wanander
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Nudges and Threats: Soft vs Hard Incentives for Tax Compliance
We study what induces delinquent wage earners to pay their taxes due, using high-quality administrative data from the Swedish Tax Agency. We find a strong effect of the standard enforcement regime: a threat of having the debt handed over to the Enforcement Agency increases payments by more than 9 percentage points (from a baseline of 58%). When including actual enforcement, payment increases by 19 percentage points compared to those who do not risk enforcement. In a field experiment, we compare these effects of standard enforcement to those involving much milder nudges, consisting of letters reminding tax delinquents to pay their taxes due. We find that a “pure nudge” (i.e., the inclusion of an extra sheet of paper with no valuable information) has an effect of around 7 percentage points for those who do not risk enforcement upon non-payment, i.e, an effect almost as large as for the threat of enforcement. However, the same nudge has no detectable effect on the group that is subject to enforcement. Finally, we find a small additional effect on payments from social norm messages both for those who risk enforcement and for those who do not.
期刊介绍:
Ekonomicheskaya Politika is a broad-range economic journal devoted primarily to the study of the economic policy of present-day Russia as well as global economic problems. The subject matters of articles includes macroeconomic, fiscal, monetary, industrial, social, regulation and competition policyand more. The journal also publishes theoretical papers in such areas as political economy, general economic theory, welfare economics, law and economics,and institutional economics.. The character and the scope of economic problems studied in many publications require a multidisciplinary approach, consistent with the editorial policy of the journal. While the thematic scope of articles is generally related to Russia, the aim of editorial policy is to cover politico-economic processes in the modern world and international economic relations, as well. In addition, Ekonomicheskaya Politika publishes Russian translations of classical and significant modern works of foreign economists.