{"title":"乌克兰、阿富汗与威慑的失败","authors":"W. Maley","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2219628","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Russia’s 2014 seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in Ukraine highlighted the limitations of a ‘rules-based’ international order in protecting a state’s territorial integrity in the face of threats to international peace and security resulting from the actions of a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. With the capacity to veto any Security Council resolution authorising ‘enforcement action’ under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, Russian leaders only had to fear the exercise under Article 51 of Ukraine’s inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. But Ukraine was in no position to drive Russian forces from Crimea unless supported by a great power such as the United States, and as Lawrence Freedman put it, ‘President Obama made it clear that he saw no circumstances in which the United States would use armed force in connection with this crisis’ (Freedman 2019, 106). The focus of the international response would instead be on extended deterrence of future Russian aggression. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 (Birnbaum et al. 2022), it became abundantly clear that Russia had not been successfully deterred from invading its western neighbour. Debate thereafter tended to focus on two points: the extent to which moves to admit Ukraine to NATO membership, anticipated by US President George W. Bush at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, might or might not have inflamed Russian elite opinion; and the importance of building a coalition of Western states to support the Ukrainian government of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, an exercise for which US President Biden on the whole received high marks. Somewhat lost in these discussions was any serious analysis of the deterrence failure that the invasion of Ukraine exposed. Yet an exploration of what deterrence means in the 21st century, and how it came to fail in the Ukrainian case, remains distinctly pertinent when one looks at other potential flashpoints such as the Middle East and East Asia. For this reason, it is worth unpacking some key elements of the idea of deterrence, and looking at what contributed to its failing in the case of Ukraine.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"407 - 414"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Ukraine, Afghanistan and the failure of deterrence\",\"authors\":\"W. Maley\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/10357718.2023.2219628\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Russia’s 2014 seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in Ukraine highlighted the limitations of a ‘rules-based’ international order in protecting a state’s territorial integrity in the face of threats to international peace and security resulting from the actions of a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. With the capacity to veto any Security Council resolution authorising ‘enforcement action’ under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, Russian leaders only had to fear the exercise under Article 51 of Ukraine’s inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. But Ukraine was in no position to drive Russian forces from Crimea unless supported by a great power such as the United States, and as Lawrence Freedman put it, ‘President Obama made it clear that he saw no circumstances in which the United States would use armed force in connection with this crisis’ (Freedman 2019, 106). The focus of the international response would instead be on extended deterrence of future Russian aggression. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 (Birnbaum et al. 2022), it became abundantly clear that Russia had not been successfully deterred from invading its western neighbour. Debate thereafter tended to focus on two points: the extent to which moves to admit Ukraine to NATO membership, anticipated by US President George W. Bush at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, might or might not have inflamed Russian elite opinion; and the importance of building a coalition of Western states to support the Ukrainian government of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, an exercise for which US President Biden on the whole received high marks. Somewhat lost in these discussions was any serious analysis of the deterrence failure that the invasion of Ukraine exposed. Yet an exploration of what deterrence means in the 21st century, and how it came to fail in the Ukrainian case, remains distinctly pertinent when one looks at other potential flashpoints such as the Middle East and East Asia. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
2014年俄罗斯对乌克兰克里米亚半岛的占领凸显了“基于规则”的国际秩序在面对联合国安理会常任理事国的行动对国际和平与安全造成的威胁时保护国家领土完整的局限性。根据《联合国宪章》(United Nations Charter)第42条,俄罗斯领导人有权否决安理会授权采取“强制行动”的任何决议,他们只需要担心乌克兰根据第51条行使其固有的单独或集体自卫权。但除非得到美国等大国的支持,否则乌克兰无法将俄罗斯军队赶出克里米亚。正如劳伦斯·弗里德曼(Lawrence Freedman)所说,“奥巴马总统明确表示,他认为美国在任何情况下都不会在这场危机中使用武力”(Freedman 2019, 106)。相反,国际社会反应的重点将是扩大对俄罗斯未来侵略的威慑。随着俄罗斯在2022年2月24日入侵乌克兰(Birnbaum et al. 2022),很明显,俄罗斯并没有成功地阻止其入侵其西部邻国。此后的辩论往往集中在两点上:美国总统乔治•w•布什(George W. Bush)在2008年布加勒斯特北约(NATO)峰会上所预期的接纳乌克兰加入北约(NATO)的举措,在多大程度上是否会激起俄罗斯精英的意见;以及建立西方国家联盟支持乌克兰总统政府的重要性,美国总统拜登在这方面总体上得到了很高的评价。这些讨论多少忽略了对入侵乌克兰所暴露出的威慑失败的认真分析。然而,当我们审视中东和东亚等其他潜在的爆发点时,探索威慑在21世纪意味着什么,以及它是如何在乌克兰事件中失败的,仍然具有明显的相关性。出于这个原因,有必要对威慑理念的一些关键要素进行分析,并研究是什么导致了它在乌克兰问题上的失败。
Ukraine, Afghanistan and the failure of deterrence
Russia’s 2014 seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in Ukraine highlighted the limitations of a ‘rules-based’ international order in protecting a state’s territorial integrity in the face of threats to international peace and security resulting from the actions of a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. With the capacity to veto any Security Council resolution authorising ‘enforcement action’ under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, Russian leaders only had to fear the exercise under Article 51 of Ukraine’s inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. But Ukraine was in no position to drive Russian forces from Crimea unless supported by a great power such as the United States, and as Lawrence Freedman put it, ‘President Obama made it clear that he saw no circumstances in which the United States would use armed force in connection with this crisis’ (Freedman 2019, 106). The focus of the international response would instead be on extended deterrence of future Russian aggression. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 (Birnbaum et al. 2022), it became abundantly clear that Russia had not been successfully deterred from invading its western neighbour. Debate thereafter tended to focus on two points: the extent to which moves to admit Ukraine to NATO membership, anticipated by US President George W. Bush at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, might or might not have inflamed Russian elite opinion; and the importance of building a coalition of Western states to support the Ukrainian government of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, an exercise for which US President Biden on the whole received high marks. Somewhat lost in these discussions was any serious analysis of the deterrence failure that the invasion of Ukraine exposed. Yet an exploration of what deterrence means in the 21st century, and how it came to fail in the Ukrainian case, remains distinctly pertinent when one looks at other potential flashpoints such as the Middle East and East Asia. For this reason, it is worth unpacking some key elements of the idea of deterrence, and looking at what contributed to its failing in the case of Ukraine.
期刊介绍:
AJIA is the journal of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. The Institute was established in 1933 as an independent and non-political body and its purpose is to stimulate interest in and understanding of international affairs among its members and the general public. The aim of the Australian Journal of International Affairs is to publish high quality scholarly research on international political, social, economic and legal issues, especially (but not exclusively) within the Asia-Pacific region. The journal publishes research articles, refereed review essays and commentary and provocation pieces. ''Articles'' are traditional scholarly articles. ‘Review essays’ use newly published books as the basis to thematically examine current events in International Relations. The journal also publishes commentaries and provocations which are high quality and engaging pieces of commentary, opinion and provocation in a variety of styles. The Australian Journal of International Affairs aims to analyse international issues for an Australian readership and to present Australian perspectives to readers in other countries. While seeking to stimulate interest in and understanding of international affairs, the journal does not seek to promote any particular policies or approaches. All suitable manuscripts submitted are sent to two referees in a full ''double blind'' refereeing process.