困惑,理解和成功

Miloud Belkoniene
{"title":"困惑,理解和成功","authors":"Miloud Belkoniene","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10051","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nThe present paper examines a type of sceptical hypothesis put forward by Adam Carter that specifically targets understanding—the Confusion Hypothesis. After clarifying the nature and scope of that hypothesis, it discusses Carter’s favoured virtue perspectivist answer to the challenge it raises. It is argued that this answer is ultimately unsatisfying as it is unable to explain how a subject can obtain assurance that her grasp of a given body of information actually results from the competences she comes to appreciate as being reliable. A different answer that relies on the practical dimension of the specific grasp involved in understanding is then offered and is shown to avoid the problems faced by Virtue Perspectivism.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Confusion, Understanding and Success\",\"authors\":\"Miloud Belkoniene\",\"doi\":\"10.1163/22105700-bja10051\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\nThe present paper examines a type of sceptical hypothesis put forward by Adam Carter that specifically targets understanding—the Confusion Hypothesis. After clarifying the nature and scope of that hypothesis, it discusses Carter’s favoured virtue perspectivist answer to the challenge it raises. It is argued that this answer is ultimately unsatisfying as it is unable to explain how a subject can obtain assurance that her grasp of a given body of information actually results from the competences she comes to appreciate as being reliable. A different answer that relies on the practical dimension of the specific grasp involved in understanding is then offered and is shown to avoid the problems faced by Virtue Perspectivism.\",\"PeriodicalId\":41464,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-02-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10051\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10051","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本文考察了亚当·卡特提出的一种专门针对理解的怀疑论假说——困惑假说。在澄清了这一假设的性质和范围后,它讨论了卡特对其提出的挑战的偏爱的美德透视主义回答。有人认为,这个答案最终是不令人满意的,因为它无法解释受试者如何获得保证,即她对给定信息的掌握实际上是由于她认为可靠的能力。然后,提供了一个不同的答案,该答案依赖于理解中所涉及的具体把握的实践维度,并被证明可以避免美德透视主义所面临的问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Confusion, Understanding and Success
The present paper examines a type of sceptical hypothesis put forward by Adam Carter that specifically targets understanding—the Confusion Hypothesis. After clarifying the nature and scope of that hypothesis, it discusses Carter’s favoured virtue perspectivist answer to the challenge it raises. It is argued that this answer is ultimately unsatisfying as it is unable to explain how a subject can obtain assurance that her grasp of a given body of information actually results from the competences she comes to appreciate as being reliable. A different answer that relies on the practical dimension of the specific grasp involved in understanding is then offered and is shown to avoid the problems faced by Virtue Perspectivism.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
0.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
16
期刊介绍: As the first international journal entirely devoted to philosophical skepticism, the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism publishes high-quality articles and discussion notes on any field of research relevant to the study of skeptical thought. The journal also contains critical notices and reviews of major books on skepticism, and organizes book symposia on recent ground-breaking works. On occasion, it publishes special issues devoted to current lively debates on specific topics or authors. The wide range of areas covered includes the history and significance of ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary skepticism as well as discussions of current specific skeptical problems and arguments in epistemology, metaethics, ontology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.
期刊最新文献
Replies to Chudnoff, Lemos, and McCain Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics, and Epistemology Critical Notice of Diego Machuca’s Pyrrhonism Past and Present Some Reluctant Skepticism about Rational Insight Confusion, Understanding and Success
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1