{"title":"垄断政治:价格竞争、学习和政策制度的演变","authors":"Erik Peinert","doi":"10.1353/wp.2023.a900713","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"abstract:In the long run, economic policy in advanced industrial states has historically alternated between favoring price competition and favoring the market power of domestic firms, across such disparate areas as antitrust, intellectual property, and trade. This article presents a theory of long-term policy change, based on the interaction of accumulating economic costs and staff turnover within the state, explaining multiple policy alternations during the twentieth century. Policy regimes of competition or market power endogenously generate diminishing returns, manifested as unintended economic costs intrinsic to competition or market power. And yet policy regimes endure because established cadres of government officials remain committed to existing policy approaches. Even as diminishing returns become apparent, it is only after the removal or circumvention of these established policymakers, through staff turnover and learning by uncommitted officials, that policy eventually changes course. The article supports this argument with extensive evidence from government archives in the United States and France.","PeriodicalId":48266,"journal":{"name":"World Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Monopoly Politics: Price Competition, Learning, and the Evolution of Policy Regimes\",\"authors\":\"Erik Peinert\",\"doi\":\"10.1353/wp.2023.a900713\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"abstract:In the long run, economic policy in advanced industrial states has historically alternated between favoring price competition and favoring the market power of domestic firms, across such disparate areas as antitrust, intellectual property, and trade. This article presents a theory of long-term policy change, based on the interaction of accumulating economic costs and staff turnover within the state, explaining multiple policy alternations during the twentieth century. Policy regimes of competition or market power endogenously generate diminishing returns, manifested as unintended economic costs intrinsic to competition or market power. And yet policy regimes endure because established cadres of government officials remain committed to existing policy approaches. Even as diminishing returns become apparent, it is only after the removal or circumvention of these established policymakers, through staff turnover and learning by uncommitted officials, that policy eventually changes course. The article supports this argument with extensive evidence from government archives in the United States and France.\",\"PeriodicalId\":48266,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"World Politics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-06-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"World Politics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2023.a900713\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"World Politics","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2023.a900713","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Monopoly Politics: Price Competition, Learning, and the Evolution of Policy Regimes
abstract:In the long run, economic policy in advanced industrial states has historically alternated between favoring price competition and favoring the market power of domestic firms, across such disparate areas as antitrust, intellectual property, and trade. This article presents a theory of long-term policy change, based on the interaction of accumulating economic costs and staff turnover within the state, explaining multiple policy alternations during the twentieth century. Policy regimes of competition or market power endogenously generate diminishing returns, manifested as unintended economic costs intrinsic to competition or market power. And yet policy regimes endure because established cadres of government officials remain committed to existing policy approaches. Even as diminishing returns become apparent, it is only after the removal or circumvention of these established policymakers, through staff turnover and learning by uncommitted officials, that policy eventually changes course. The article supports this argument with extensive evidence from government archives in the United States and France.
期刊介绍:
World Politics, founded in 1948, is an internationally renowned quarterly journal of political science published in both print and online versions. Open to contributions by scholars, World Politics invites submission of research articles that make theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature, review articles, and research notes bearing on problems in international relations and comparative politics. The journal does not publish articles on current affairs, policy pieces, or narratives of a journalistic nature. Articles submitted for consideration are unsolicited, except for review articles, which are usually commissioned. Published for the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Affairs