家族治理的现代转型:家族权威与家族正式制度的共同演化

IF 1.8 Q3 MANAGEMENT Nankai Business Review International Pub Date : 2021-08-30 DOI:10.1108/nbri-07-2020-0036
Jun Ma
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文旨在探讨非正式关系治理(即家族涉入和个人权威)与家族正式治理系统在成长和转型过程中的共同演化关系。这种共同演化关系尤其受外部制度环境和市场竞争力的影响。因此,在深化改革和改变市场的综合过程中,家族企业的现代转型意味着对家族企业独特优势的重新发现,而这种转型的核心是对地位特权和私人利益的治理。为了检验这些假设,本文使用了2010年第9次中国民营企业调查。共发放问卷4900份,回收问卷4614份,总回收率为94.16%。在清理数据后,该研究获得了1239个样本。为了克服可能存在的异方差,本研究采用可行广义最小二乘(FGLS)对模型进行估计。此外,对于虚拟因变量,本研究采用logistic回归。本文实证检验了制度变迁和组织成长意愿驱动的家族治理在成长和转型过程中的演化,包括家族卷入与治理制度之间的共同演化关系。同时,实证分析得出,关系治理的制度约束提高了企业绩效,进一步促进了家族企业治理的现代转型。家族企业能否超越传统的裙带关系、宗法权威和家族意志的干预,是向现代企业组织转型的关键。这一过程的根本是利用正式制度来管理家族权力。原创性/价值本文从马克斯·韦伯提出的现代理想主导类型的视角探讨了形式组织的现代转型。现代组织是一种非人格化与人格化制度的混合系统。现代组织遭受侵蚀和破坏的主要原因是在包括家族企业在内的现代组织中,非正式制度(地位和关系网络)被赋予了法律特权和私人利益。特权与私人利益的治理成为家族企业能否发挥工具价值,成功实现现代化转型的核心问题。
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The modern transformation of family governance: co-evolve of family authority and family formal institution
Purpose This paper aims to investigate the co-evolve relationship between informal relational governance (i.e. family involvement and personal authority) and family formal governance system in the process of growth and transformation. This co-evolve relationship is especially affected by the external institutional environment and market competition power. Thus, in the comprehensive process of deepening the reform and changing market, the modern transformation of family business means that rediscovery of unique superiority of family business and the core of this transformation is the governance of status privileges and private interests. Design/methodology/approach To test the hypotheses, this paper uses the 9th Chinese Private Enterprise Survey in 2010. A total of 4,900 questionnaires are issued, 4,614 are recovered and the total recovery rate is 94.16%. After clean the data, the study obtained 1,239 samples. To overcome the possible existence of heteroscedasticity, this study uses the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) to estimate the model. Besides, as for dummy dependent variables, this study uses logistics regression. Findings This paper makes an empirical test for the evolution of family governance driven by institutional change and organizational growth willingness in the process of growth and transformation, including a co-evolve relationship between family involvement and governance institution. Meanwhile, the empirical analysis comes to the conclusion that the institutional constraint to relational governance improves firm performance, which further promotes the modern transformation of family business governance. Practical implications It is the key to transformation to the modern corporate organization that family business could beyond the intervention of the traditional nepotism, patriarchal authority and family will. The fundamental of this process is to take advantage of formal institutions to manage family power. Originality/value This paper discusses the modern transformation of the formal organization from the perspective of modern ideal dominant type proposed by Max Weber. Modern organization is a hybrid system of the non-personified and personified institution. The primary reason why modern organization suffered erosion and destruction is that informal institution (status and relationship network) were endowed with legal privileges and private interests in modern organization including family business. The governance of privileges and private interests has become the core issue that whether the family business could play an instrumental value and realize modern transformation successfully.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
3.60%
发文量
32
期刊介绍: Nankai Business Review International (NBRI) provides insights in to the adaptation of American and European management theory in China, the differences and exchanges between Chinese and western management styles, the relationship between Chinese enterprises’ management practice and social evolution and showcases the development and evolution of management theories based on Chinese cultural characteristics. The journal provides research of interest to managers and entrepreneurs worldwide with an interest in China as well as research associations and scholars focusing on Chinese problems in business and management.
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