协调合规激励措施

IF 2.5 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW Cornell Law Review Pub Date : 2017-09-24 DOI:10.31228/osf.io/ktj7x
Veronica S. Root
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引用次数: 6

摘要

在当今的监管环境中,从事不法行为的公司可以肯定一件事:监管机构将指出,无效的合规计划是机构不当行为的关键原因。鉴于政府行为者——从司法部到证券交易委员会,甚至到商务部——都强调机构需要采用“有效的合规计划”,合规重要性的激增并不令人惊讶。然而,要求有效遵守计划的政府行为者的权力范围很窄。美国司法部负责处理违反《反海外腐败法》(Foreign Corrupt Practices Act)的行为,美国证券交易委员会(SEC)负责根据证券法对不当行为的指控进行裁决,美国联邦贸易委员会(Federal Trade Commission)负责处理有关反竞争行为的担忧。这种执法权力的分割造成了监管机构之间的信息和协调问题,导致执法制度以零敲碎打的方式裁决机构不当行为。执法行动关注的是对某一套特定法律的遵守情况,而不是公司的不法行为是否是系统性合规失败的结果,这需要对整个公司进行全面的合规检查。因此,政府激励公司实施“有效的道德和合规计划”的目标似乎与目前的执法方法不一致。然而,政府行为者目前拥有必要的工具,可以在必要时为企业提供强有力的激励,以参与其合规计划的重组。本文认为,提高企业合规性的努力将受益于以下监管机制:(i)识别一个机构在不同监管领域的累犯行为,以及(ii)积极制裁惯犯机构。如果政府行为体采用旨在“协调合规激励”的新执行策略,他们可以更容易地发现一个机构何时遭受系统性合规失败,这可能会阻止公司从事累犯行为。如果企业对在不同监管领域屡教不改的行为负责,可能会鼓励它们对合规计划实施更有力的改革,最终在上市公司内部改善道德行为,制定更有效的合规计划。
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Coordinating Compliance Incentives
In today’s regulatory environment, a corporation engaged in wrongdoing can be sure of one thing: regulators will point to an ineffective compliance program as a key cause of institutional misconduct. The explosion in the importance of compliance is unsurprising given the emphasis that governmental actors — from the Department of Justice, to the Securities and Exchange Commission, to even the Commerce Department — place on the need for institutions to adopt “effective compliance programs.” The governmental actors that demand effective compliance programs, however, have narrow scopes of authority. DOJ Fraud handles violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, while the SEC adjudicates claims of misconduct under the securities laws, and the Federal Trade Commission deals with concerns regarding anticompetitive behavior. This segmentation of enforcement authority has created an information and coordination problem amongst regulators, resulting in an enforcement regime where institutional misconduct is adjudicated in a piecemeal fashion. Enforcement actions focus on compliance with a particular set of laws instead of on whether the corporate wrongdoing is a result of a systematic compliance failure that requires a comprehensive, firm-wide, compliance overhaul. As a result, the government’s goal of incentivizing companies to implement “effective ethics and compliance programs” appears at odds with its current enforcement approach.Yet governmental actors currently have the tools necessary to provide strong inducements for corporations to, when needed, engage in restructuring of their compliance programs. This Article argues that efforts to improve corporate compliance would benefit from regulatory mechanisms that (i) recognize when an institution is engaged in recidivist behavior across diverse regulatory areas and(ii) aggressively sanction institutions that are repeat offenders. If governmental actors adopt a new enforcement strategy aimed at “Coordinating Compliance Incentives,” they can more easily detect when an institution is suffering from a systemic compliance failure, which may deter firms from engaging in recidivist behavior. If corporations are held responsible for being repeat offenders across diverse regulatory areas, it may encourage them to implement more robust reforms to their compliance programs and, ultimately, lead to improved ethical conduct and more effective compliance programs within public companies.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
4.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Founded in 1915, the Cornell Law Review is a student-run and student-edited journal that strives to publish novel scholarship that will have an immediate and lasting impact on the legal community. The Cornell Law Review publishes six issues annually consisting of articles, essays, book reviews, and student notes.
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