{"title":"中国高管薪酬与银行风险","authors":"Qiubin Huang","doi":"10.17811/ebl.12.1.2023.62-67","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Executive compensation is an important mechanism of corporate governance for banks, but its effect on bank risk remains inconclusive. Based on a sample of banks listed in China, we uncover a significantly positive relationship between executive compensation and bank risk during the 2007–2018 period. The finding is robust to model specifications, the risk measures used, and the way to calculate executive compensation.","PeriodicalId":43184,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Business Letters","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Executive compensation and bank risk in China\",\"authors\":\"Qiubin Huang\",\"doi\":\"10.17811/ebl.12.1.2023.62-67\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Executive compensation is an important mechanism of corporate governance for banks, but its effect on bank risk remains inconclusive. Based on a sample of banks listed in China, we uncover a significantly positive relationship between executive compensation and bank risk during the 2007–2018 period. The finding is robust to model specifications, the risk measures used, and the way to calculate executive compensation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":43184,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economics and Business Letters\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-03-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economics and Business Letters\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.17811/ebl.12.1.2023.62-67\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics and Business Letters","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.17811/ebl.12.1.2023.62-67","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Executive compensation is an important mechanism of corporate governance for banks, but its effect on bank risk remains inconclusive. Based on a sample of banks listed in China, we uncover a significantly positive relationship between executive compensation and bank risk during the 2007–2018 period. The finding is robust to model specifications, the risk measures used, and the way to calculate executive compensation.
期刊介绍：
Economics and Business Letters is an open access journal that publishes both theoretical and empirical quality original papers in all economics and business fields. In addition, relevant discussions on current policy issues will be considered for the Policy Watch section. As general strategy of EBL, the journal will launch calls for papers for special issues on topics of interest, generally with invited guest editors. The maximum length of the letters is limited to 2,500 words.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
分享
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
