对中国反贫困运动的严密监督和官僚支持

IF 0.5 4区 社会学 Q3 AREA STUDIES China-An International Journal Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI:10.1353/chn.2022.0014
Qingjie Zeng, C. Zuo, Zhongyuan Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要:在中国,主要的政策举措通常是通过运动式的动员来实施的,这种动员旨在通过加强监督活动来提高官僚机构的反应能力。人们对街道层面的官僚们对动员方法的看法知之甚少。这篇文章认为,严厉的监管措施使官僚们处于高度紧张的工作环境中,并降低了他们的士气。通过这些机制,严格的监督可能会破坏官僚机构对中央政策运动的支持。一项针对负责实施精准扶贫计划的农村官员的全国调查数据支持了这一论点。研究结果表明,虽然竞选动员可以立即产生政策效果,但其对官僚士气和能力的负面影响不应被忽视。
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Intense Monitoring and Bureaucratic Support for an Anti-poverty Campaign in China
Abstract:In China, major policy initiatives are often implemented through campaign-style mobilisation which seeks to increase bureaucratic responsiveness through intensified monitoring activities. Little is known about the views of street-level bureaucrats regarding the mobilisation approach. This article argues that draconian monitoring measures have placed bureaucrats in a highly stressful working environment and lowered their morale. Through these mechanisms, intense monitoring can undermine bureaucratic support for central policy campaigns. Data from a national survey of rural officials responsible for implementing the targeted poverty alleviation (TPA) programme support the argument. The findings imply that while campaign mobilisation can deliver immediate policy results, its negative impact on bureaucratic morale and capacity should not be ignored.
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0.90
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32
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