超越非理想:为什么批判理论需要乌托邦维度

IF 1.1 3区 哲学 Q3 ETHICS Journal of Social Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-20 DOI:10.1111/josp.12542
Titus Stahl
{"title":"超越非理想:为什么批判理论需要乌托邦维度","authors":"Titus Stahl","doi":"10.1111/josp.12542","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"John Rawls famously argues that in order to arrive at a plausible conception of what justice requires politically, we ought to proceed in two steps (Rawls, 1971, pp. 245–246). First, we ought to develop an “ideal theory of justice” that lays out what principles of justice can be justified if we imagine them to govern a society that is unlike ours in that certain limitations are removed. Developing such a theory, Rawls argues, is necessary to allow us to grasp the correct conception of justice. In a second step, we can then use this conception to find out what we must do in our actual, nonideal circumstances. The idea that we need to refer to a utopian, ideal state of affairs in order to understand which conception of our most basic political concepts we ought to endorse is one of the features of Rawls's thought that has attracted the most commentary (see Robeyns, 2008; Simmons, 2010; Valentini, 2012). Realist opponents of ideal theory in this sense sometimes argue that ideal theory pays too little attention to questions of feasibility, that it does not take the limitations of human nature seriously enough, and that it is ill-equipped to guide us when thinking about necessary trade-offs (Farrelly, 2007; Galston, 2010; Nagel, 1995). In this article, I will examine arguments of a different nature that have historically emerged from the tradition of radical social thought and critical theory. These arguments do not object to ideal theorizing on the grounds that it leads to unrealistic demands or that it is insufficiently constrained by a realistic conception of human nature. Rather, these arguments assume that, given the nonideal circumstances in which current political theorists find themselves, they face limitations to their epistemic, imaginative, and conceptual capacities that distort the ideals they formulate and thereby take them in a direction that accommodates the status quo too much. Received: 7 December 2022 Revised: 6 April 2023 Accepted: 7 July 2023","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Beyond the nonideal: Why critical theory needs a utopian dimension\",\"authors\":\"Titus Stahl\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/josp.12542\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"John Rawls famously argues that in order to arrive at a plausible conception of what justice requires politically, we ought to proceed in two steps (Rawls, 1971, pp. 245–246). First, we ought to develop an “ideal theory of justice” that lays out what principles of justice can be justified if we imagine them to govern a society that is unlike ours in that certain limitations are removed. Developing such a theory, Rawls argues, is necessary to allow us to grasp the correct conception of justice. In a second step, we can then use this conception to find out what we must do in our actual, nonideal circumstances. The idea that we need to refer to a utopian, ideal state of affairs in order to understand which conception of our most basic political concepts we ought to endorse is one of the features of Rawls's thought that has attracted the most commentary (see Robeyns, 2008; Simmons, 2010; Valentini, 2012). Realist opponents of ideal theory in this sense sometimes argue that ideal theory pays too little attention to questions of feasibility, that it does not take the limitations of human nature seriously enough, and that it is ill-equipped to guide us when thinking about necessary trade-offs (Farrelly, 2007; Galston, 2010; Nagel, 1995). In this article, I will examine arguments of a different nature that have historically emerged from the tradition of radical social thought and critical theory. These arguments do not object to ideal theorizing on the grounds that it leads to unrealistic demands or that it is insufficiently constrained by a realistic conception of human nature. Rather, these arguments assume that, given the nonideal circumstances in which current political theorists find themselves, they face limitations to their epistemic, imaginative, and conceptual capacities that distort the ideals they formulate and thereby take them in a direction that accommodates the status quo too much. Received: 7 December 2022 Revised: 6 April 2023 Accepted: 7 July 2023\",\"PeriodicalId\":46756,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Social Philosophy\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-07-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Social Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12542\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ETHICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Social Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12542","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

约翰·罗尔斯(John Rawls)著名地认为,为了对正义在政治上的要求达成一个合理的概念,我们应该分两步进行(Rawls,1971,第245-246页)。首先,我们应该发展一种“理想的正义理论”,阐明如果我们想象正义的原则来治理一个与我们不同的社会,即消除某些限制,那么正义的原则是合理的。罗尔斯认为,发展这样一种理论对于我们正确理解正义是必要的。在第二步中,我们可以使用这个概念来找出我们在实际的、不理想的情况下必须做什么。为了理解我们应该支持我们最基本的政治概念中的哪一个概念,我们需要提及乌托邦式的理想状态,这是罗尔斯思想的一个最受评论的特征(见Robeyns,2008;西蒙斯,2010年;Valentini,2012)。在这个意义上,理想理论的现实主义反对者有时会认为,理想理论对可行性问题关注太少,它没有足够认真地对待人性的局限性,并且在思考必要的权衡时,它没有能力指导我们(Farrelly,2007;加尔斯顿,2010年;纳格尔,1995年)。在这篇文章中,我将考察历史上从激进社会思想和批判理论传统中产生的不同性质的论点。这些论点并不反对理想的理论化,理由是它会导致不切实际的要求,或者它没有受到对人性的现实概念的充分约束。相反,这些论点认为,鉴于当前政治理论家所处的非理想环境,他们的认识、想象和概念能力受到限制,扭曲了他们所形成的理想,从而使他们朝着过于适应现状的方向发展。接收日期:2022年12月7日修订日期:2023年4月6日接受日期:2024年7月7日
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Beyond the nonideal: Why critical theory needs a utopian dimension
John Rawls famously argues that in order to arrive at a plausible conception of what justice requires politically, we ought to proceed in two steps (Rawls, 1971, pp. 245–246). First, we ought to develop an “ideal theory of justice” that lays out what principles of justice can be justified if we imagine them to govern a society that is unlike ours in that certain limitations are removed. Developing such a theory, Rawls argues, is necessary to allow us to grasp the correct conception of justice. In a second step, we can then use this conception to find out what we must do in our actual, nonideal circumstances. The idea that we need to refer to a utopian, ideal state of affairs in order to understand which conception of our most basic political concepts we ought to endorse is one of the features of Rawls's thought that has attracted the most commentary (see Robeyns, 2008; Simmons, 2010; Valentini, 2012). Realist opponents of ideal theory in this sense sometimes argue that ideal theory pays too little attention to questions of feasibility, that it does not take the limitations of human nature seriously enough, and that it is ill-equipped to guide us when thinking about necessary trade-offs (Farrelly, 2007; Galston, 2010; Nagel, 1995). In this article, I will examine arguments of a different nature that have historically emerged from the tradition of radical social thought and critical theory. These arguments do not object to ideal theorizing on the grounds that it leads to unrealistic demands or that it is insufficiently constrained by a realistic conception of human nature. Rather, these arguments assume that, given the nonideal circumstances in which current political theorists find themselves, they face limitations to their epistemic, imaginative, and conceptual capacities that distort the ideals they formulate and thereby take them in a direction that accommodates the status quo too much. Received: 7 December 2022 Revised: 6 April 2023 Accepted: 7 July 2023
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
2.20
自引率
12.50%
发文量
44
期刊最新文献
Issue Information Issue Information - NASSP Page Contributors Introduction for special issue on “Excellence, diversity, and the philosophy exception” Property as power: A theory of representation
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1