Of Crimes and Crowns

This article explains variation in state cooperation with International Criminal Court (ICC)’s investigations and prosecutions across cases and over time. The idea motivating this study stems from the observation of the mixed record of state cooperation with ICC operations. For legal professionals and scholars this observation is puzzling, since states falling within the ICC’s territorial jurisdiction are legally bound to provide full judicial assistance to the Court. Thus, why do some countries entertain collaborative relations with the ICC while others display hostility towards it? I argue that state leaders’ perceptions of potential ICC indictment best explain variation in state behaviour. This article aims to contribute to a better understanding of how state attitudes form and of the extent to which external actors, spearheaded by the ICC Prosecutor’s Office (OTP), can change them. The research findings suggest that: 1) neither formal state consent (ratification) nor regime type are reliable predictors of state cooperation; 2) state leaders’ perception of potential ICC indictment appears better suited to correctly predict state behaviour in all the situations investigated by the OTP; 3) the OTP’s signalling strategy — including the timing of its intervention — affects state leaders’ perception of future ICC indictment and, in turn, the prospects of state cooperation; 4) when state authorities deny cooperation, regime change provides a one-time opportunity to start ICC–state relations anew.