The Legislature in Intra-Executive Crisis and Institutional Instability in Nigeria

The preeminence of legitimate institutional preferences distinguishes popular government from dictatorship. The imperative for viable legislative institutions to the consolidation of popular government in Nigeria cannot be overemphasized. This study interrogates legislatures’ complicity in intra-executive conflicts, deputy-governorship turnover, and institutional instability, with a view to mitigate further undermining of the institution of the legislature. Qualitative method, descriptive analysis, theories of separation of powers, institutionalization, and the prebendal conception of the Nigeria state, its post-colonial and post-conflict transactional politics suffice. The 1999 Constitution features bicameral national, and unicameral subnational assemblies and multi-level executives. It enjoins separation of powers with delineation of the functional boundaries of governmental institutions vis-à-vis the rule of law to guard against encroachment and impunity. Sections 176 and 186 provide for Governor, and Deputy-Governor, common to all the thirty-six States. Sections 130 and 141 provide for President and Vice-President respectively. Deputy-Governor is significant, as next to, and prospective Governor. Governorship candidates pick running mate for election and voters express support for the duo correspondingly. However, the ‘potential advantage is often counteracted by the prevalence of crisis-ridden executives’, exacerbate by compromised legislatures. Subnational legislative-executive relationship was characterized by the manipulation of legislatures by Governors to personal political ends. Cases abound of intra-executive crisis of confidence that thwarted collective executive successes while leaving both institutions deeply divided amidst accusations, counter-accusations and indictments. A survey of these cases reveals extensive legislatures’ complicity in summary impeachment, forced resignation and intimidation of many Deputy-Governors on sundry allegations leading to high Deputy-Governorship turnover. Pliable legislatures became executives’ whipping tools at the disposal of Governors to whip uncooperative and recalcitrant deputies into line, within days in blatant subversion of the Constitution. Judicial reviews invalidating identified undue legislative interferences underscore vexed question on legislatures’ autonomy, internal complexity and universalism, making mockery of constitutional government.