基于索赔问题方法的欧盟温室气体排放分配

IF 0.6 Q4 ECONOMICS Games Pub Date : 2023-01-20 DOI:10.3390/g14010009
Foroogh Salekpay
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引用次数: 1

摘要

由于全球变暖的挑战,欧盟签署了《巴黎协定》(2015年),以减少温室气体排放总量。本文阐述了欧盟成员国在2021-2030年期间想要实现《巴黎协定》的目标时所面临的冲突,即到2030年温室气体排放量减少55%(与1990年的温室气体排放相比)。欧盟成员国的排放水平必须低于其排放需求。为了解决这个问题,我们采用索赔问题方法,将不足的资源分配给需求更大的各方。我们使用几个众所周知的划分规则来划分欧盟成员国的排放预算。我们定义了一组划分规则应满足的原则,以选择最优化的分配方法。为了减少各国偏好对分配的影响,我们使用公平和稳定标准来检验规则的公平性。此外,我们通过两种方式分配排放预算:首先,我们应用划分规则在各国之间分配2021-2030年的总排放预算。第二,我们从2021年到2030年每年分配排放预算。我们建议,约束平等奖(CEA)是实现2030年目标的适当划分规则。
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The Allocation of Greenhouse Gas Emission in European Union through Applying the Claims Problems Approach
Due to the challenge of global warming, the European Union (EU) signed the Paris Agreement (2015) to diminish total Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. This paper addresses the conflict that EU member states face when they want to follow the target of the Paris Agreement for the period 2021–2030 which is a 55% GHG emission reduction by 2030 (compared with GHG emission in 1990). EU member states have to emit at a level that is lower than their emission needs. To solve this problem, we implement the claims problems approach as a method for distributing insufficient resources among parties with greater demands. We use several well-known division rules to divide the emission budget among EU member states. We define a set of principles that should be satisfied by division rules to select the most optimal allocation method. To diminish the effect of countries’ preferences on the allocation we use equity and stability criteria to examine the fairness of the rules. Moreover, we allocate the emission budget in two ways: First, we apply division rules to allocate the total emission budget for 2021–2030 among countries. Second, we allocate the emission budget annually from 2021 to 2030. We propose that Constrained Equal Awards (CEA) is an appropriate division rule to meet the target of 2030.
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来源期刊
Games
Games Decision Sciences-Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
11.10%
发文量
65
审稿时长
11 weeks
期刊介绍: Games (ISSN 2073-4336) is an international, peer-reviewed, quick-refereeing open access journal (free for readers), which provides an advanced forum for studies related to strategic interaction, game theory and its applications, and decision making. The aim is to provide an interdisciplinary forum for all behavioral sciences and related fields, including economics, psychology, political science, mathematics, computer science, and biology (including animal behavior). To guarantee a rapid refereeing and editorial process, Games follows standard publication practices in the natural sciences.
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