{"title":"重新思考尼日利亚石油区块分配、发展和汇款的“主顾”政治","authors":"V. Iwuoha","doi":"10.1080/03056244.2021.1998768","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This research adopts qualitative method and patron–client analysis to underscore the political economy of oil block allocation, development and receipts/remittances in Nigeria. It contests Wilson’s (1961) and Scott’s (1972) claims on the superiority of the patron over clients, and argues that ‘clients’ in Nigeria (indigenous oil block awardees) maintain some degree of control over the patron (ruling elite), enjoy more economic returns/oil rents, and possess some leverage over the patrons’ decision-making power. The ruling elite’s personalisation of oil block allocation/rents results in poor development of the upstream oil sector by ‘clients’, defaults in oil remittances and a consistent decline in oil production. The author recommends that the bidding process for oil block allocation be carried out in a more transparent and competitive manner.","PeriodicalId":47526,"journal":{"name":"Review of African Political Economy","volume":"48 1","pages":"552 - 580"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Rethinking the ‘patron–client’ politics of oil block allocation, development and remittances in Nigeria\",\"authors\":\"V. Iwuoha\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/03056244.2021.1998768\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT This research adopts qualitative method and patron–client analysis to underscore the political economy of oil block allocation, development and receipts/remittances in Nigeria. It contests Wilson’s (1961) and Scott’s (1972) claims on the superiority of the patron over clients, and argues that ‘clients’ in Nigeria (indigenous oil block awardees) maintain some degree of control over the patron (ruling elite), enjoy more economic returns/oil rents, and possess some leverage over the patrons’ decision-making power. The ruling elite’s personalisation of oil block allocation/rents results in poor development of the upstream oil sector by ‘clients’, defaults in oil remittances and a consistent decline in oil production. The author recommends that the bidding process for oil block allocation be carried out in a more transparent and competitive manner.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47526,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Review of African Political Economy\",\"volume\":\"48 1\",\"pages\":\"552 - 580\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-10-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Review of African Political Economy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2021.1998768\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"AREA STUDIES\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of African Political Economy","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2021.1998768","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"AREA STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
Rethinking the ‘patron–client’ politics of oil block allocation, development and remittances in Nigeria
ABSTRACT This research adopts qualitative method and patron–client analysis to underscore the political economy of oil block allocation, development and receipts/remittances in Nigeria. It contests Wilson’s (1961) and Scott’s (1972) claims on the superiority of the patron over clients, and argues that ‘clients’ in Nigeria (indigenous oil block awardees) maintain some degree of control over the patron (ruling elite), enjoy more economic returns/oil rents, and possess some leverage over the patrons’ decision-making power. The ruling elite’s personalisation of oil block allocation/rents results in poor development of the upstream oil sector by ‘clients’, defaults in oil remittances and a consistent decline in oil production. The author recommends that the bidding process for oil block allocation be carried out in a more transparent and competitive manner.
期刊介绍：
The Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE) is a refereed journal committed to encouraging high quality research and fostering excellence in the understanding of African political economy. Published quarterly by Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group for the ROAPE international collective it has since 1974 provided radical analysis of trends and issues in Africa. It has paid particular attention to the political economy of inequality, exploitation and oppression, whether driven by global forces or local ones (such as class, race, community and gender), and to materialist interpretations of change in Africa. It has sustained a critical analysis of the nature of power and the state in Africa.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
分享
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
