科斯定理的再认识

Jingang Zhao
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引用次数: 5

摘要

本文在三个方面取得了进展:1)修正了科斯定理的空核问题;(2)它提供了交易成本的最小上限,低于该上限可获得最优或最有效的结果;3)建立了两个数学定理,抓住了科斯定理的主要见解和主要方面。定理的一个更简单的版本是,在没有交易成本的联合生产经济中,最大收益将由最优企业产生,并分配在始终非空的核心中。
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A Reexamination of the Coase Theorem
This paper makes three advances: 1) It fixes the empty-core problem of the Coase theorem; 2) it provides the smallest upper bound of transaction costs below which the optimal or efficient outcomes can be achieved; and 3) it establishes two mathematical theorems that capture the main insights and major aspects of the Coase theorem. A simpler version of the theorems says that in a coalitional production economy without transaction costs, the maximal payoff will be produced by the optimal firms and be allocated in the always non-empty core.
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