交通运输网络公司劳动法规分析

IF 2.2 3区 工程技术 Q2 ECONOMICS Economics of Transportation Pub Date : 2022-12-01 DOI:10.1016/j.ecotra.2022.100284
Akhil Shetty , Sen Li , Hamidreza Tavafoghi , Junjie Qin , Kameshwar Poolla , Pravin Varaiya
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引用次数: 2

摘要

在世界范围内,监管优步和Lyft等交通网络公司(TNCs)的运动越来越多。这是由于对司机工资过低的担忧。加州最近通过了两项劳工法规,即第5号议会法案(AB5)和第22号提案(Prop 22)。AB5将司机(和其他零工经济工人)归类为雇员,而不是承包商。这意味着网约车公司必须向司机支付最低工资和相关福利,司机必须全职工作。这在两个方面对跨国公司的商业模式产生了负面影响:(a)工资效应:更高的工资和福利显著降低了利润率;(b)灵活性效应:拥有全职司机的基础,降低了Uber和Lyft等跨国公司在较短的时间尺度上匹配司机供应与客户需求的能力。作为替代方案,跨国公司为第22号提案进行了激烈的游说。这一规定为司机提供最低工资的120%,但仅限于为旅行服务的驾驶时间(参与时间)。本文利用旧金山市的数据研究了这些和其他可能的法规的影响。我们开发了一个市场均衡模型,根据跨国公司的定价决策捕捉乘客需求和司机供给。我们表明,AB5下的灵活性效应可以通过提供交错的驾驶员换挡来很大程度上缓解。工资的影响是巨大的,破坏了跨国公司商业模式的生存能力。我们发现,工资效应导致跨国公司利润减少18%,而灵活性效应导致利润减少1%-10%,这取决于班次的设计方式。另一方面,第22号提案将保留跨国公司的盈利能力,但第22号提案所承诺的保证工作时间工资不足以实质性提高司机工资。我们表明,这一问题不能通过进一步提高工作时间工资来解决,因为这将增加乘客票价,增加司机的巡航时间,降低效率,并显著减少跨国公司的利润。然后,我们建议对上述每项规定进行适当的修改,以改善司机和乘客的结果,而不会危及跨国公司的商业模式。
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An analysis of labor regulations for transportation network companies

There is a growing movement worldwide to regulate transportation network companies (TNCs) such as Uber and Lyft. This is driven by concerns over low driver wages. Two recent labor regulations that were passed in California are Assembly Bill 5 (AB5) and Proposition 22 (Prop 22). AB5 classifies drivers (and other gig-economy workers) as employees as opposed to contractors. The implication is that ride-hailing companies must pay drivers a minimum wage and associated benefits, and that the drivers work full-time. This negatively impacts the TNC business model in two ways: (a) wage effect: higher wages and benefits reduce profit margins significantly, and (b) flexibility effect: having a base of full time drivers reduces the ability of TNCs like Uber and Lyft to match driver supply to customer demand on a fine temporal scale. As an alternative, TNCs lobbied fiercely for Prop 22. This regulation offers drivers 120% of minimum wage, but only for driving hours spent servicing a trip (engaged time).

This paper studies the impacts of these and other possible regulations using data from the city of San Francisco. We develop a market-equilibrium model that captures passenger demand and driver supply in response to TNC’s pricing decisions. We show that the flexibility effect under AB5 can be largely mitigated by offering staggered driver shifts. The wage effect is substantial and undermines the viability of the TNC business model. We find that the wage effect leads to a 18% decrease in TNC profit, whereas the flexibility effect results in a profit reduction ranging between 1%–10% depending on how shifts are designed. On the other hand, Prop 22 will preserve TNC profitability, but the guaranteed engaged time wage promised by Prop 22 is insufficient to materially increase driver wages. We show that this concern cannot be addressed by further increasing the engaged time wage, as it will increase passenger fares, increase driver cruising time, reduce efficiency, and significantly reduce TNC profit. We then suggest suitable modifications to each of the above regulations that can improve outcomes for drivers and passengers without jeopardizing the TNC business model.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.50
自引率
7.10%
发文量
19
审稿时长
69 days
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