非对称公域困境中的协调与合作:一项复制研究

Johannes Jarke-Neuert
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引用次数: 0

摘要

Janssen等人(Exp Econ 14:547-566, 2014)研究了一种不对称的、有限重复的公共池资源困境,这种困境具有自由形式的通信,其中主体决定对基础设施的投资,以及从该基础设施提供的资源中提取资源。他们发现,基础设施提供和联合收益趋同于高水平,因为结构上有利的“前端”倾向于通过在开采阶段自愿限制自己来公平行事,而结构上不利的“尾部”则通过投资来回报。这篇论文报告了一个完全独立的、预先注册的、在不同实验室进行的双盲复制尝试,它也提供了更高的统计能力,并坚持了科学透明和开放的最高原则。我们发现Janssen等人的关键结果不仅在定性上再次出现,而且在定量和统计上得到了加强。因此,从结果中得出的结论是稳健的,基本设计可以自信地用于后续研究。补充信息在线版本提供补充资料,网址为10.1007/s40881-023-00131-9。
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Coordination and cooperation in asymmetric commons dilemmas: a replication study
Janssen et al. (Exp Econ 14:547–566, 2014) studied an asymmetric, finitely repeated common-pool resource dilemma with free-form communication in which subjects made decisions about investments in an infrastructure, and about extraction from a resource made available by this infrastructure. They found that infrastructure provision and joint payoffs converged to high levels because structurally advantaged head-enders tend to behave fairly by restricting themselves voluntarily at the extraction stage, and structurally disadvantaged “tail-enders” reciprocate by investing. This paper reports a fully independent, pre-registered, double-blind replication attempt conducted in a different lab, that also supplies elevated statistical power and adheres to the highest principles of scientific transparency and openness. We find that the key results of Janssen et al. not only re-appear qualitatively but are quantitatively and statistically strengthened. The conclusions drawn from the results are therefore robust, and the basic design can be confidently used for follow-up research. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s40881-023-00131-9.
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