{"title":"非对称公域困境中的协调与合作:一项复制研究","authors":"Johannes Jarke-Neuert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3928469","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Janssen et al. (Exp Econ 14:547–566, 2014) studied an asymmetric, finitely repeated common-pool resource dilemma with free-form communication in which subjects made decisions about investments in an infrastructure, and about extraction from a resource made available by this infrastructure. They found that infrastructure provision and joint payoffs converged to high levels because structurally advantaged head-enders tend to behave fairly by restricting themselves voluntarily at the extraction stage, and structurally disadvantaged “tail-enders” reciprocate by investing. This paper reports a fully independent, pre-registered, double-blind replication attempt conducted in a different lab, that also supplies elevated statistical power and adheres to the highest principles of scientific transparency and openness. We find that the key results of Janssen et al. not only re-appear qualitatively but are quantitatively and statistically strengthened. The conclusions drawn from the results are therefore robust, and the basic design can be confidently used for follow-up research. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s40881-023-00131-9.","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"9 1","pages":"123 - 135"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2021-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Coordination and cooperation in asymmetric commons dilemmas: a replication study\",\"authors\":\"Johannes Jarke-Neuert\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3928469\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Janssen et al. (Exp Econ 14:547–566, 2014) studied an asymmetric, finitely repeated common-pool resource dilemma with free-form communication in which subjects made decisions about investments in an infrastructure, and about extraction from a resource made available by this infrastructure. They found that infrastructure provision and joint payoffs converged to high levels because structurally advantaged head-enders tend to behave fairly by restricting themselves voluntarily at the extraction stage, and structurally disadvantaged “tail-enders” reciprocate by investing. This paper reports a fully independent, pre-registered, double-blind replication attempt conducted in a different lab, that also supplies elevated statistical power and adheres to the highest principles of scientific transparency and openness. We find that the key results of Janssen et al. not only re-appear qualitatively but are quantitatively and statistically strengthened. The conclusions drawn from the results are therefore robust, and the basic design can be confidently used for follow-up research. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s40881-023-00131-9.\",\"PeriodicalId\":91563,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of the Economic Science Association\",\"volume\":\"9 1\",\"pages\":\"123 - 135\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-09-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of the Economic Science Association\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3928469\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3928469","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Coordination and cooperation in asymmetric commons dilemmas: a replication study
Janssen et al. (Exp Econ 14:547–566, 2014) studied an asymmetric, finitely repeated common-pool resource dilemma with free-form communication in which subjects made decisions about investments in an infrastructure, and about extraction from a resource made available by this infrastructure. They found that infrastructure provision and joint payoffs converged to high levels because structurally advantaged head-enders tend to behave fairly by restricting themselves voluntarily at the extraction stage, and structurally disadvantaged “tail-enders” reciprocate by investing. This paper reports a fully independent, pre-registered, double-blind replication attempt conducted in a different lab, that also supplies elevated statistical power and adheres to the highest principles of scientific transparency and openness. We find that the key results of Janssen et al. not only re-appear qualitatively but are quantitatively and statistically strengthened. The conclusions drawn from the results are therefore robust, and the basic design can be confidently used for follow-up research. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s40881-023-00131-9.