Ambivalence: A Philosophical Exploration

ing intuitions. It is likely clear at this point that I prefer the more externalist route, which allows for the goodness of a reason to play an explanatory role in belief formation. However, Mitova has good arguments on her side, and it may be unpalatable to some to allow that false beliefs and good reasons do not share an ontology: if I believe that it is raining, I’ll take an umbrella whether or not it is actually raining. It is plausible to suppose that the same thing is doing the explanatory work in both cases. This intuition works in Mitova’s favour. However, whether or not you accept her conclusions, this book is well worth reading. It is both rigorous and readable, challenging and accessible. It is a beautiful demonstration of clarity of thought and precise argument, and it carves out a substantial and unique position in the field of the nature of reasons.