独裁者博弈中的分配行为理论

IF 0.4 Q4 ECONOMICS Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics Pub Date : 2018-05-31 DOI:10.1177/0260107918764174
António Osório
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文试图在没有明确假设效用函数的情况下解释独裁者游戏中观察到的行为。或者,我从利他主义和利己主义的角度来考虑一个由异质个体组成的社会的代表性行为。基于这两个原则,我提出了一个集合社会偏好的分配。结果在很大程度上取决于独裁者所争议资源的价值。即使资源的价值对独裁者来说极其重要,独裁者也无法证明资源份额超过总量的3/4是合理的。提出超过这一资源份额的分配无法达成社会共识。另一方面,如果资源的价值对社会来说足够不重要,那么资源的平等分配就会在极限中出现。
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A Behavioural Theory of Allocation in the Dictator Game
This article attempts to explain the behaviour observed in the dictator game without explicitly assuming a utility function. Alternatively, I consider the repre- sentative behaviour of a society composed of heterogeneous individuals in terms of altruism and self-interest. Based on these two principles, I present an allocation that aggregates the society's preferences. The result depends crucially on the value of the resource under dispute for the dictator. Even if the value of the resource is extremely important for the dictator, the dictator cannot justify a share of the resource larger than 3/4 of the total. An allocation proposing more than this share of the resource cannot reach social consensus. On the other extreme, if the value of the resource is sufficiently unimportant for the society, an equal split of the resource emerges in the limit.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
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发文量
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