Robert Merl , Stefan Palan , Dominik Schmidt , Thomas Stöckl
{"title":"内幕交易监管与交易员迁移","authors":"Robert Merl , Stefan Palan , Dominik Schmidt , Thomas Stöckl","doi":"10.1016/j.finmar.2023.100839","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Discussions about insider trading regulation veer between the poles of forbidding insider trading to protect market integrity and allowing insider trading to foster informational efficiency. We study traders’ preferences for regulation by offering them concurrent markets with different regulatory regimes in an experimental setting. We find that informed traders’ preference for the unregulated market causes both informed and uninformed traders to be more active in the unregulated market. This market, thus, sees more trading volume, lower spreads, and less mispricing. Nevertheless, uninformed traders suffer greater losses in unregulated markets, while informed traders profit from the absence of regulation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47899,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Markets","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S138641812300037X/pdfft?md5=0a547f16c0c54abdad7660685881411c&pid=1-s2.0-S138641812300037X-main.pdf","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Insider trading regulation and trader migration\",\"authors\":\"Robert Merl , Stefan Palan , Dominik Schmidt , Thomas Stöckl\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.finmar.2023.100839\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Discussions about insider trading regulation veer between the poles of forbidding insider trading to protect market integrity and allowing insider trading to foster informational efficiency. We study traders’ preferences for regulation by offering them concurrent markets with different regulatory regimes in an experimental setting. We find that informed traders’ preference for the unregulated market causes both informed and uninformed traders to be more active in the unregulated market. This market, thus, sees more trading volume, lower spreads, and less mispricing. Nevertheless, uninformed traders suffer greater losses in unregulated markets, while informed traders profit from the absence of regulation.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47899,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Financial Markets\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S138641812300037X/pdfft?md5=0a547f16c0c54abdad7660685881411c&pid=1-s2.0-S138641812300037X-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Financial Markets\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S138641812300037X\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Financial Markets","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S138641812300037X","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Discussions about insider trading regulation veer between the poles of forbidding insider trading to protect market integrity and allowing insider trading to foster informational efficiency. We study traders’ preferences for regulation by offering them concurrent markets with different regulatory regimes in an experimental setting. We find that informed traders’ preference for the unregulated market causes both informed and uninformed traders to be more active in the unregulated market. This market, thus, sees more trading volume, lower spreads, and less mispricing. Nevertheless, uninformed traders suffer greater losses in unregulated markets, while informed traders profit from the absence of regulation.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Financial Markets publishes high quality original research on applied and theoretical issues related to securities trading and pricing. Area of coverage includes the analysis and design of trading mechanisms, optimal order placement strategies, the role of information in securities markets, financial intermediation as it relates to securities investments - for example, the structure of brokerage and mutual fund industries, and analyses of short and long run horizon price behaviour. The journal strives to maintain a balance between theoretical and empirical work, and aims to provide prompt and constructive reviews to paper submitters.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
分享
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
