外国直接投资与东道国承诺的稳健性

IF 0.7 Q3 ECONOMICS Review of Economic Analysis Pub Date : 2022-06-28 DOI:10.15353/rea.v14i1.3582
Shaikh Shahnawaz
{"title":"外国直接投资与东道国承诺的稳健性","authors":"Shaikh Shahnawaz","doi":"10.15353/rea.v14i1.3582","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a model of a forward-looking government wooing foreign direct investment by enacting policies that reflect its commitment to the foreign enterprise. The ease with which the government is able to spend or carry out economic reform to complement the foreign venture evolves over time and influences the likelihood of its sustained commitment. The domestic and external strength of the government, the stability and not necessarily the level of returns from the project, venture-specificity of government spending or reform, and public and elite attitudes toward foreign commercial entry determine how invested the government remains in the long term success of the enterprise. More committed governments tend to be stronger and prefer robust investor-regime relationships. Reform that is not designed too narrowly to favor the investor is also less likely to be reversed later. Like pro-FDI public sentiment, a noisy policy environment induces deeper government commitment.","PeriodicalId":42350,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2022-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Foreign Direct Investment and the Robustness of Host-Country Commitment\",\"authors\":\"Shaikh Shahnawaz\",\"doi\":\"10.15353/rea.v14i1.3582\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper presents a model of a forward-looking government wooing foreign direct investment by enacting policies that reflect its commitment to the foreign enterprise. The ease with which the government is able to spend or carry out economic reform to complement the foreign venture evolves over time and influences the likelihood of its sustained commitment. The domestic and external strength of the government, the stability and not necessarily the level of returns from the project, venture-specificity of government spending or reform, and public and elite attitudes toward foreign commercial entry determine how invested the government remains in the long term success of the enterprise. More committed governments tend to be stronger and prefer robust investor-regime relationships. Reform that is not designed too narrowly to favor the investor is also less likely to be reversed later. Like pro-FDI public sentiment, a noisy policy environment induces deeper government commitment.\",\"PeriodicalId\":42350,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Review of Economic Analysis\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-06-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Review of Economic Analysis\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.15353/rea.v14i1.3582\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Economic Analysis","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15353/rea.v14i1.3582","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本文提出了一个前瞻性政府通过制定反映其对外国企业承诺的政策来吸引外国直接投资的模型。随着时间的推移,政府支出或实施经济改革以补充外资企业的容易程度在不断变化,并影响其持续承诺的可能性。政府的国内和外部实力、项目的稳定性(不一定是回报水平)、政府支出或改革的风险特异性,以及公众和精英对外资进入的态度,决定了政府对企业长期成功的投资程度。更坚定的政府往往更强大,更喜欢稳健的投资者制度关系。如果改革的设计不是过于狭隘地偏向于投资者,那么以后逆转的可能性也较小。与支持外国直接投资的公众情绪一样,嘈杂的政策环境也会促使政府做出更深层次的承诺。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Foreign Direct Investment and the Robustness of Host-Country Commitment
This paper presents a model of a forward-looking government wooing foreign direct investment by enacting policies that reflect its commitment to the foreign enterprise. The ease with which the government is able to spend or carry out economic reform to complement the foreign venture evolves over time and influences the likelihood of its sustained commitment. The domestic and external strength of the government, the stability and not necessarily the level of returns from the project, venture-specificity of government spending or reform, and public and elite attitudes toward foreign commercial entry determine how invested the government remains in the long term success of the enterprise. More committed governments tend to be stronger and prefer robust investor-regime relationships. Reform that is not designed too narrowly to favor the investor is also less likely to be reversed later. Like pro-FDI public sentiment, a noisy policy environment induces deeper government commitment.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
10
审稿时长
26 weeks
期刊最新文献
The Nexus between Causal Macroeconomic Relations in Japan Foreign Direct Investment and the Robustness of Host-Country Commitment The (non) impact of education on marital dissolution Demand for Money in Greece After Euro Area and Policy Uncertainties Ethnic Inequality and Anti-authoritarianism in Sub-Saharan Africa
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1