{"title":"具有相互依存价值的最优双边贸易","authors":"Teemu Pekkarinen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3950363","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We derive the seller's utility maximizing selling mechanism in bilateral trade with interdependent values. Due to the interdependencies in valuations, finding the optimal mechanism is an informed seller problem. It turns out that the optimal selling procedure is no longer a take-it-or-leave-it offer if the buyer's valuation of the object is even a slightly positively dependent on the seller's type.","PeriodicalId":74863,"journal":{"name":"SSRN","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Optimal Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Values\",\"authors\":\"Teemu Pekkarinen\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3950363\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We derive the seller's utility maximizing selling mechanism in bilateral trade with interdependent values. Due to the interdependencies in valuations, finding the optimal mechanism is an informed seller problem. It turns out that the optimal selling procedure is no longer a take-it-or-leave-it offer if the buyer's valuation of the object is even a slightly positively dependent on the seller's type.\",\"PeriodicalId\":74863,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"SSRN\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-10-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"SSRN\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3950363\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"SSRN","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3950363","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Optimal Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Values
We derive the seller's utility maximizing selling mechanism in bilateral trade with interdependent values. Due to the interdependencies in valuations, finding the optimal mechanism is an informed seller problem. It turns out that the optimal selling procedure is no longer a take-it-or-leave-it offer if the buyer's valuation of the object is even a slightly positively dependent on the seller's type.
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