繁荣还是挣扎:以信任为中心的管理控制是否鼓励知识共享和团队绩效?

IF 3.6 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2023-05-01 DOI:10.1016/j.aos.2022.101429
Robin R. Radtke , Roland F. Speklé , Sally K. Widener
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引用次数: 3

摘要

我们研究了以信任为中心的控制组合是否会促进知识共享行为,进而促进团队绩效。使用来自138个业务单元管理团队(共534名受访者)的多源数据,我们发现团队内部部族控制和团队内部监控通过知识共享与团队绩效呈正相关,而相对强调基于团队的激励则不然。我们还发现,基于团队的激励和团队内家族控制是替代品,而团队内监测补充了基于团队的奖励和团队内宗族控制。这些结果表明,以信任为中心的控制可以鼓励知识共享;此外,团队内部监控对于从使用基于团队的激励或团队家族控制中获得最大利益至关重要。然而,企业可以在团队内部的部落控制和基于团队的激励之间做出替代选择,因为它们都鼓励共同的目标。
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Flourish or flounder: Do trust-centric management controls encourage knowledge sharing and team performance?

We examine whether combinations of trust-centric controls promote knowledge sharing behavior, and, in turn, team performance. Using multi-source data from 138 business unit management teams (534 total respondents), we find that in-team clan control and in-team monitoring are positively associated with team performance via knowledge sharing, while the relative emphasis on team-based incentives is not. We also find that team-based incentives and in-team clan control are substitutes, while in-team monitoring complements both team-based incentives and in-team clan control. These results show that trust-centric controls can encourage knowledge sharing; moreover, in-team monitoring is important to getting the most benefit from using team-based incentives or in-team clan control. However, firms can make substitution choices between in-team clan control and team-based incentives as they both encourage a shared purpose.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
6.40%
发文量
38
期刊介绍: Accounting, Organizations & Society is a major international journal concerned with all aspects of the relationship between accounting and human behaviour, organizational structures and processes, and the changing social and political environment of the enterprise.
期刊最新文献
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