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Performance evaluation criteria and information processing in complex decision making 复杂决策中的绩效评价标准与信息处理
IF 4 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2026-01-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2026.101632
Xiqiong He , Xi (Jason) Kuang , Ziyang Li , Jordan Samet
We use two experiments to examine how the design of performance evaluation criteria influences agents' information processing in complex decision-making tasks. Drawing on goal hierarchy theory, we predict that, when agents are evaluated on the actions they take to perform their task (low-level evaluation criteria), they will focus primarily on salient cues in the task setting, whereas evaluating how agents’ work impacts organizational objectives (high-level evaluation criteria) will increase their attention to less salient yet relevant information cues. As predicted, in the first experiment, we find that agents exhibit the numerosity heuristic under low-level evaluation criteria, indicative of over-attention to salient task cues, but not under high-level criteria. In the second experiment, we find that, when making performance predictions, agents under low-level evaluation criteria fixate on summary earnings measures while not attending adequately to less salient cues, and high-level evaluation criteria mitigate this fixation. Taken together, these findings provide convergent support for our theory. We discuss the implications of our findings for accounting research and practice.
我们使用两个实验来检验在复杂决策任务中,绩效评价标准的设计如何影响agent的信息处理。根据目标层次理论,我们预测,当评估代理人为执行任务所采取的行动时(低水平评价标准),他们将主要关注任务设置中的显著线索,而评估代理人的工作如何影响组织目标(高水平评价标准)将增加他们对不太显著但相关的信息线索的关注。正如预测的那样,在第一个实验中,我们发现智能体在低水平评价标准下表现出对显著任务线索的过度关注,而在高水平评价标准下则没有表现出对显著任务线索的过度关注。在第二个实验中,我们发现,在进行绩效预测时,低水平评估标准下的主体会关注汇总收益指标,而不会充分关注不太显著的线索,而高水平评估标准会减轻这种关注。综上所述,这些发现为我们的理论提供了趋同的支持。我们讨论了我们的发现对会计研究和实践的影响。
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引用次数: 0
Being dishonest to feel better: How intolerance of uncertainty fuels performance misreporting 不诚实让自己感觉更好:对不确定性的不容忍如何助长业绩谎报
IF 4 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-12-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2025.101631
Sabra Khajehnejad , Amit Kumar , Marwan Sinaceur
This paper proposes that individuals with higher intolerance of uncertainty are more prone to misreporting their performance in internal reporting settings when there is high performance evaluation uncertainty. In contrast, under low performance evaluation uncertainty, intolerance of uncertainty does not affect performance misreporting. We test this prediction across six studies. Studies 1–4 operationalize performance evaluation uncertainty through supervisor's word-deed inconsistency and examine the effect in real-world (Studies 1–2) and controlled experimental settings (Studies 3–4). To assess generalizability, Study 5 manipulates leadership and organizational change and Study 6 manipulates market change to create different levels of performance evaluation uncertainty. Across all six studies, we find consistent support for our hypothesis. Individuals with higher intolerance of uncertainty experience stronger uneasy, negative feelings (e.g., discomfort and anxiety) when performance evaluation uncertainty is high, and the desire to reduce these negative feelings leads them to impulsively misreport their performance. This paper highlights the emotion-driven aspect of performance misreporting and demonstrates that misreporting is shaped not only by individual traits but also by supervisor's behavior and broader organizational and environmental factors that contribute to performance evaluation uncertainty.
本文提出,当内部报告设置中存在较高的绩效评估不确定性时,不确定性容忍度较高的个体更容易误报其绩效。相反,在低绩效评估不确定性下,对不确定性的容忍不影响绩效误报。我们通过六项研究验证了这一预测。研究1-4通过主管言行不一致来操作绩效评估的不确定性,并在现实世界(研究1-2)和受控实验环境(研究3-4)中检验效果。为了评估普遍性,研究5操纵领导和组织变革,研究6操纵市场变化,以创造不同程度的绩效评估不确定性。在所有六项研究中,我们发现我们的假设得到了一致的支持。当绩效评估的不确定性较高时,不确定性耐受度较高的个体会经历更强烈的不安、负面情绪(如不适和焦虑),而减少这些负面情绪的愿望导致他们冲动地误报自己的绩效。本文强调了绩效错报的情绪驱动方面,并表明错报不仅受到个人特征的影响,还受到主管行为和更广泛的组织和环境因素的影响,这些因素会导致绩效评估的不确定性。
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引用次数: 0
Between hierarchical nostalgia and fatalistic resignation – The case of Italian Commercialisti's pursuit of economic and symbolic capitals 在等级怀旧与宿命顺从之间——意大利商人对经济资本与象征资本的追求
IF 4 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-12-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2025.101628
Chiara Crovini , Lukas Goretzki , Pier Luigi Marchini , Paolo Andrei
Focusing on Italian accountants (Commercialisti), who are usually professionals working alone or in small firms, we examine how small practitioners experience and navigate the dynamics between professionalism and commercialism. Drawing on empirical material from roundtable meetings and interviews with Commercialisti, and using a framework that examines how culturally patterned dispositions shape their experiences of field and capital conversion dynamics, we explore how these professionals engage reflexively with concerns about recognition. Our analysis shows how reflexive engagement with field positioning amidst tensions between professionalism and commercialism is tied to small practitioners' concerns about recognition, stemming from experiences of ‘failed capital conversions’. We unpack these concerns through Commercialisti's reflections on their quest for ‘fair compensation’, which functions for them as recognition that matters not only for economic survival but also for sustaining their position in a symbolic hierarchy dominated by large firms and prestigious peers. In doing so, we demonstrate how Commercialisti's concerns about fair compensation, while economic in form, are deeply symbolic in function and how reflexivity plays an ambivalent role in such pursuits of recognition. While reflexivity enhances awareness of lacking status and power and triggers aspirations to address these constraints, it simultaneously heightens frustration about the structural and symbolic conditions that limit the feasibility of such strategies. This ambivalence produces a ‘reflexive impasse’ at the intersection of hierarchical nostalgia and fatalist resignation, leaving Commercialisti caught between attachment to institutionalized norms and a prevailing sense that change is unattainable, which stalls identity transformation despite ongoing efforts to reclaim recognition.
专注于意大利会计师(Commercialisti),他们通常是单独工作或在小公司工作的专业人士,我们研究了小从业者如何体验和驾驭专业和商业主义之间的动态。利用圆桌会议的经验材料和对商业主义者的采访,并使用一个框架来研究文化模式的性格如何塑造他们的领域和资本转换动态的经验,我们探讨了这些专业人士如何反射性地关注认可。我们的分析表明,在专业主义和商业主义之间的紧张关系中,对领域定位的反射性参与与小从业者对认可的担忧有关,这源于“失败的资本转换”的经验。我们通过商业主义者对他们追求“公平报酬”的反思来解开这些担忧,这对他们来说不仅是对经济生存的重要认识,也是对维持他们在由大公司和有声望的同行主导的象征性等级制度中的地位的重要认识。在这样做的过程中,我们展示了商业主义者对公平薪酬的关注,虽然形式上是经济的,但在功能上是深刻的象征,以及反身性在这种追求认可的过程中是如何发挥矛盾作用的。虽然反身性增强了对缺乏地位和权力的意识,并引发了解决这些限制的愿望,但它同时也加剧了对限制此类策略可行性的结构性和象征性条件的挫败感。这种矛盾心理在等级怀旧和宿命论顺从的交叉点产生了“反身性僵局”,使商业主义者陷入对制度化规范的依恋和一种普遍的感觉,即改变是无法实现的,这阻碍了身份的转变,尽管正在努力重新获得认可。
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引用次数: 0
The moderating effects of management's Non-GAAP treatment of a CAM item and investors' position on investors' management credibility judgments 管理层对CAM项目的非公认会计准则处理和投资者立场对投资者管理层可信度判断的调节作用
IF 4 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-12-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2025.101629
Wei Chen , Kirsten Fanning , Ken T. Trotman , Jun Wang
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引用次数: 0
The effect of political connections on COVID-19 stimulus 政治关系对COVID-19刺激措施的影响
IF 4 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-12-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2025.101630
John Barrick , Adam Olson , Shiva Rajgopal
We investigate whether corporate political activity (CPA) benefited organizations during the distribution of COVID-19 stimulus funds. Using data on three mechanisms of political influence—lobbying expenditures, PAC contributions, and trade association lobbying—we analyze their impact on the most extensive stimulus package in U.S. history. Our findings reveal that publicly listed firms engaging in CPA were significantly more likely to receive COVID-19 stimulus support. Compared to firms without political activity, the odds of receiving government assistance were 91.5 % higher for firms that lobbied directly, 148.9 % higher for those contributing to PACs, and 112.1 % higher for those lobbying through trade associations. Financial returns on political influence were $0.11 per dollar spent on lobbying, $7.26 per dollar for PAC contributions, and $2.40 per dollar spent on trade association lobbying. Notably, returns were two to four times greater when CPA targeted specific policymakers or agencies responsible for fund disbursement. We find some evidence of an association between CPA and reduced stimulus efficiency or effectiveness at the agency level. Our study highlights the financial impact of political influence during stimulus events in times of global uncertainty, emphasizing the need for further research into its implications for policymaking.
我们调查了企业政治活动(CPA)是否在分配COVID-19刺激资金期间使组织受益。利用三种政治影响机制的数据——游说支出、政治行动委员会捐款和贸易协会游说——我们分析了它们对美国历史上最广泛的经济刺激方案的影响。我们的研究结果表明,从事注册会计师的上市公司更有可能获得COVID-19刺激支持。与没有政治活动的公司相比,直接游说的公司获得政府援助的几率高出91.5%,为政治行动委员会捐款的公司获得政府援助的几率高出148.9%,通过行业协会进行游说的公司获得政府援助的几率高出112.1%。政治影响力的财务回报为:游说支出每1美元0.11美元,政治行动委员会捐款每1美元7.26美元,行业协会游说支出每1美元2.40美元。值得注意的是,当CPA针对负责资金支付的特定政策制定者或机构时,回报率会高出两到四倍。我们发现了一些证据,证明CPA与机构层面刺激效率或有效性降低之间存在关联。我们的研究强调了在全球不确定时期,政治影响在刺激事件中的金融影响,强调需要进一步研究其对政策制定的影响。
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引用次数: 0
Expanding the analysis of accounting regulation: On the operationalization of disclosure regulation 拓展会计监管分析:论披露监管的操作性
IF 4 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-12-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2025.101627
Dasha Smirnow , David J. Cooper
We propose a more expansive analysis of accounting regulation, highlighting the significance of a regulatory network and the importance of examining the recursive processes involved in the transition from formal law to practice. Our analysis is grounded in the sociology of law and is exemplified by the case of a corporate disclosure regulation for Canada's extractive industry. The paper examines how the regulator, in concert with intermediary actors, works to clarify and influence the practice of law, what we refer to as operationalization. In providing a historically and socially contextualized analysis, the paper treats regulation as a dynamic process that includes multistakeholder working groups, legislative debates, regulatory procedures, and shifting meanings of compliance and enforcement. We examine operationalization as a distinct regulatory dynamic and explore its significance for an expanded understanding of accounting regulation.
我们建议对会计监管进行更广泛的分析,强调监管网络的重要性,以及检查从正式法律到实践过渡所涉及的递归过程的重要性。我们的分析以法律社会学为基础,并以加拿大采掘业的公司信息披露法规为例。本文考察了监管机构如何与中介行为者协同工作,以澄清和影响法律实践,我们称之为操作化。在提供历史和社会背景的分析中,本文将监管视为一个动态过程,包括多利益相关者工作组、立法辩论、监管程序以及合规和执行的不断变化的含义。我们将操作化作为一种独特的监管动态来研究,并探讨其对扩大会计监管理解的意义。
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引用次数: 0
Voluntary managerial pay cuts and employee effort 管理层自愿减薪和员工努力
IF 4 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-11-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2025.101626
Christoph Feichter , Martin Wiernsperger
When managers voluntarily cut their own pay, it is often dismissed as symbolic gesture that employees do not care about. We conduct a series of four experiments to examine whether and how such pay cuts influence employee effort, and how the effect varies depending on two key design features: (1) how the forgone pay is used and (2) whether the pay cut is voluntary or externally imposed. Across our experiments, we find that managerial pay cuts increase employee effort, particularly when the forgone pay benefits employees or social causes, and when the cut is a voluntary act of self-sacrifice. Employees respond positively even when managers retain compensation through other channels, such as bonuses or stock awards. Our results suggest that the motivational effect is not only driven by reduced pay dispersion or material outcomes, but also by the perceived intention behind the manager's voluntary pay cut. Overall, our study shows that the gesture of managerial pay cuts can meaningfully influence employee behavior and enhance firm performance, and it identifies the conditions under which such effects are most likely to occur.
当经理们自愿减薪时,通常会被认为是象征性的姿态,员工们并不关心。我们进行了一系列的四个实验,以检验这种减薪是否以及如何影响员工的努力,以及这种影响如何取决于两个关键的设计特征:(1)放弃的薪酬如何使用;(2)减薪是自愿的还是外部强加的。在我们的实验中,我们发现管理层减薪会增加员工的努力,尤其是当放弃的薪酬有利于员工或社会事业,以及当减薪是一种自愿的自我牺牲行为时。即使管理者通过奖金或股票奖励等其他渠道保留薪酬,员工也会积极回应。我们的研究结果表明,激励效应不仅受到薪酬分散或物质结果减少的驱动,还受到经理自愿减薪背后的感知意图的驱动。总体而言,我们的研究表明,管理层减薪的姿态可以对员工行为产生有意义的影响,并提高公司绩效,并且它确定了这种影响最有可能发生的条件。
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引用次数: 0
Can open audit committee chairs cure the chilling effect of management's presence on auditors' information sharing during audit committee meetings? 公开的审计委员会主席能否消除管理层出席审计委员会会议对审计师分享信息的寒蝉效应?
IF 4 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-11-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2025.101618
Lukas J. Helikum , Karim Jamal , Hun-Tong Tan , Li Xiao
This study experimentally examines how the leadership style of the audit committee (AC) chair (controlling or open) influences the amount of discretionary information that auditors intend to share with the AC, in the context of common meeting formats (i.e., AC meetings with versus without management present, or private meetings between the auditor and AC chair). Participants are highly experienced auditors, including partners and (senior) managers, from Big 4 accounting firms. We predict and find that an open AC chair mitigates the chilling effect of management's presence on the number of discretionary issues shared with the AC. Compared to those who attend AC meetings only, auditors who engage in private meetings with the AC chair before AC meetings plan to disclose fewer discretionary issues to the AC in subsequent AC meetings, but disclose more discretionary issues in total across meetings. AC chair leadership style has no impact on their discretionary information sharing in these private meetings. These results suggest that open AC chairs can mitigate the adverse effect of management's presence on auditors' discretionary information disclosure and have implications for regulators aiming to enhance corporate governance.
本研究通过实验检验了审计委员会(AC)主席的领导风格(控制型或开放式)如何影响审计师打算与AC分享的自由裁量信息的数量,在常见的会议形式(即,有管理层出席的AC会议或没有管理层出席的AC会议,或审计师与AC主席之间的私人会议)的背景下。参与者都是经验丰富的审计师,包括来自四大会计师事务所的合伙人和(高级)经理。我们预测并发现,开放式的审计委员会主席可以减轻管理层出席对与审计委员会共享的自由裁量问题数量的寒蝉效应。与那些只参加审计委员会会议的人相比,在审计委员会会议之前与审计委员会主席进行私人会议的审计师计划在随后的审计委员会会议中向审计委员会披露更少的自由裁量问题,但在整个会议中披露更多的自由裁量问题。AC主席的领导风格对他们在这些私人会议上的自由裁量信息共享没有影响。这些结果表明,开放式AC主席可以减轻管理层存在对审计师自由裁量信息披露的不利影响,并对旨在加强公司治理的监管机构具有启示意义。
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引用次数: 0
Infrapolitical resistance to management control in the home workplace 对家庭工作场所管理控制的非政治抵制
IF 4 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-11-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2025.101617
Mohamed Chelli, Darlene Himick
In this study, we examine how workers resist management controls in the home workplace. Drawing on Scott's (1985, 1990) theorization about the everyday forms of resistance, especially his seminal concepts of infrapolitical resistance and hidden transcripts, and mobilizing a netnographic approach, we examine the comments posted on Reddit during a 10-month period, in which workers talk about their resistance to the ways in which they are controlled in the home-based work environment. We uncover six hidden transcripts representing workers' infrapolitical resistance to management control in the home workplace, which we categorize into two sets: resistance thoughts and beliefs and individual acts of resistance. Home office workers describe and discuss their resistance attitudes and ideas around 1) the new limits of acceptable levels and types of controls, 2) the very worth of the managerial role, and 3) employers' cultural controls. Also, home office workers resist via their actions by 4) performing “empty labor; ” 5) quitting their job in response to return-to-office mandates; and 6) selectively meeting productivity-related controls. Bringing a new empirical site − the home as a workplace − to the management control literature, we theorize about the ways in which home office workers transform productivity into a site of resistance, turn the control gaze back on the managers, and use the home office to resist controls.
在这项研究中,我们研究了工人在家庭工作场所如何抵制管理控制。根据斯科特(1985.1990)关于日常抵抗形式的理论,特别是他的非政治抵抗和隐藏文本的开创性概念,并动员网络研究方法,我们研究了Reddit上发布的10个月期间的评论,其中工人谈论他们对家庭工作环境中控制方式的抵抗。我们发现了六个隐藏的文本,代表了工人在家庭工作场所对管理控制的非政治抵抗,我们将其分为两组:抵抗思想和信仰以及个人抵抗行为。家庭办公室员工描述并讨论了他们对以下方面的抵制态度和想法:1)可接受的控制水平和类型的新限制;2)管理角色的价值;3)雇主的文化控制。此外,在家办公的人通过他们的行动来抵制“空劳动”;(五)按照换届要求辞职的;6)选择性地满足与生产力相关的控制。将一个新的经验场所——家作为工作场所——引入到管理控制的文献中,我们对在家办公的员工如何将生产力转变为反抗的场所、将控制的目光转回到经理身上、并利用在家办公来反抗控制进行了理论化。
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引用次数: 0
Is a picture worth a thousand words? Image usage in ESG reports 一张图片胜过千言万语吗?ESG报告中的图像使用情况
IF 4 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2025-11-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2025.101616
Disen Huang Albrecht , Divya Anantharaman , Keyi Zhao
We collect a novel dataset on images in Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) reports using deep learning and artificial intelligence (AI), to test hypotheses arising from experimental literature that visual impression management enhances audience perception. We further combine AI and manual methods to contrast images that lack information content (“generic images” evoking broad ESG themes) against images with information content (“specific images” depicting firm-specific ESG activities). We hypothesize and find that firms (1) operating in socially problematic industries (e.g., “sinful”, polluting, or controversial industries), (2) issuing less extensive textual ESG disclosures, and (3) experiencing poor ESG performance tend to use more images, especially generic images, consistent with strategic motivations. We then examine the impact of image usage on stakeholders, observing unduly enhanced perception in retail traders but seldom in institutional investors. We observe that ESG award committees reward specific images and penalize generic images. Our results show that ESG report visual impression management affects stakeholders in the real world, though its impact can be overcome by attention and expertise.
我们使用深度学习和人工智能(AI)收集了环境、社会和治理(ESG)报告中的图像的新数据集,以检验实验文献中提出的视觉印象管理增强受众感知的假设。我们进一步结合人工智能和人工方法,将缺乏信息内容的图像(唤起广泛ESG主题的“通用图像”)与具有信息内容的图像(描述公司特定ESG活动的“特定图像”)进行对比。我们假设并发现:(1)经营有社会问题的行业(例如,“有罪”、污染或有争议的行业),(2)发布的ESG文本披露较少,以及(3)ESG表现不佳的公司倾向于使用更多符合战略动机的图像,尤其是通用图像。然后,我们研究了形象使用对利益相关者的影响,观察到零售交易者的认知过度增强,而机构投资者的认知却很少。我们观察到,ESG奖委员会奖励特定的图像,而惩罚一般的图像。我们的研究结果表明,ESG报告视觉印象管理会影响现实世界中的利益相关者,尽管其影响可以通过注意力和专业知识来克服。
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引用次数: 0
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Accounting Organizations and Society
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