W. Heaston, Matthew C. Mitchell, Jeffrey A. Kappen
{"title":"组织腐败控制的制度思考","authors":"W. Heaston, Matthew C. Mitchell, Jeffrey A. Kappen","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02603007","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n This article applies and expands on a typology of organizational corruption control to analyze the various mechanisms used to address corruption within the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). It uses case study evidence in tandem with insights from neo-institutional theory to construct a conceptual framework in which corruption control types are more completely examined within their broader institutional context. Using this framework, the article shows how the persistence of corruption in FIFA and its checkered reform process are attributable to an organizational filtering phenomenon that has limited the operation of internal and external corruption controls. Finally, it discusses some implications of this framework for transnational organizational governance reform.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":"26 1","pages":"403-427"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2020-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/19426720-02603007","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Institutional Reflections on Organizational Corruption Control\",\"authors\":\"W. Heaston, Matthew C. Mitchell, Jeffrey A. Kappen\",\"doi\":\"10.1163/19426720-02603007\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n This article applies and expands on a typology of organizational corruption control to analyze the various mechanisms used to address corruption within the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). It uses case study evidence in tandem with insights from neo-institutional theory to construct a conceptual framework in which corruption control types are more completely examined within their broader institutional context. Using this framework, the article shows how the persistence of corruption in FIFA and its checkered reform process are attributable to an organizational filtering phenomenon that has limited the operation of internal and external corruption controls. Finally, it discusses some implications of this framework for transnational organizational governance reform.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47262,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Global Governance\",\"volume\":\"26 1\",\"pages\":\"403-427\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-09-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/19426720-02603007\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Global Governance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02603007\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Global Governance","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02603007","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Institutional Reflections on Organizational Corruption Control
This article applies and expands on a typology of organizational corruption control to analyze the various mechanisms used to address corruption within the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). It uses case study evidence in tandem with insights from neo-institutional theory to construct a conceptual framework in which corruption control types are more completely examined within their broader institutional context. Using this framework, the article shows how the persistence of corruption in FIFA and its checkered reform process are attributable to an organizational filtering phenomenon that has limited the operation of internal and external corruption controls. Finally, it discusses some implications of this framework for transnational organizational governance reform.