具有上下配额的稳定多对一匹配问题的细粒度视图

IF 1.1 Q4 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2020-09-29 DOI:10.1145/3546605
Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger
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引用次数: 9

摘要

在具有较低和较高配额的NP困难的医院居民问题(HR-QLU)中,目标是找到居民与医院的稳定匹配,其中与医院匹配的居民数量在其较低和较高配额之间或为零。我们从参数化复杂性的角度分析了这个问题,使用了几个自然参数,如医院数量和居民数量。此外,在回答Biró等人的一个公开问题[TCS 2010]时,我们提出了一种相关的多项式时间算法,该算法在具有最大较低配额2的实例上找到稳定匹配(如果存在)。除了HR-QLU,我们还考虑了两个密切相关的独立利益模型,即HR-QLU的特殊情况,其中每个医院只有较低的配额而没有较高的配额,以及HR-QLU在医院对居民没有偏好的情况下的变化,这也被称为具有较低和较高配额的住房分配问题。最后,当偏好可能包含联系时,我们研究了这三个NP难题的参数化复杂性。
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A Fine-grained View on Stable Many-to-one Matching Problems with Lower and Upper Quotas
In the NP-hard Hospital Residents problem with lower and upper quotas (HR-QLU), the goal is to find a stable matching of residents to hospitals where the number of residents matched to a hospital is either between its lower and upper quota or zero. We analyze this problem from a parameterized complexity perspective using several natural parameters such as the number of hospitals and the number of residents. Moreover, answering an open question of Biró et al. [TCS 2010], we present an involved polynomial-time algorithm that finds a stable matching (if it exists) on instances with maximum lower quota two. Alongside HR-QLU, we also consider two closely related models of independent interest, namely, the special case of HR-QLU where each hospital has only a lower quota but no upper quota and the variation of HR-QLU where hospitals do not have preferences over residents, which is also known as the House Allocation problem with lower and upper quotas. Last, we investigate the parameterized complexity of these three NP-hard problems when preferences may contain ties.
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来源期刊
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS-
CiteScore
3.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
期刊介绍: The ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation welcomes submissions of the highest quality that concern the intersection of computer science and economics. Of interest to the journal is any topic relevant to both economists and computer scientists, including but not limited to the following: Agents in networks Algorithmic game theory Computation of equilibria Computational social choice Cost of strategic behavior and cost of decentralization ("price of anarchy") Design and analysis of electronic markets Economics of computational advertising Electronic commerce Learning in games and markets Mechanism design Paid search auctions Privacy Recommendation / reputation / trust systems Systems resilient against malicious agents.
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