官僚结构与遵守国际协定

IF 5 1区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE American Journal of Political Science Pub Date : 2023-08-13 DOI:10.1111/ajps.12811
Shannon P. Carcelli
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引用次数: 1

摘要

为什么一些国家遵守国际协议,而另一些国家却无视这些协议?在这篇文章中,我介绍了一个以前没有考虑过的解释:官僚结构。我建立了一个理性选择模型,考察了官僚结构对合规性的影响,表明几个不同的官僚机构的存在可以通过使一些官僚免受遵守国际协议的压力来压制对国际协议的遵守。我通过2001年经合组织一项协议的新编码数据来研究这一理论,该协议旨在降低与捐助国产品和服务“挂钩”的援助百分比——这种做法在特殊利益集团中很受欢迎,但会降低外国援助的有效性。我发现,与传统的发展官僚机构相比,非发展导向的官僚机构,如内政部、劳工部和能源部,遵守协议的可能性要小得多。这也涉及到州一级,在州一级拥有许多援助机构的州不如精简官僚机构的州顺从。
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Bureaucratic Structure and Compliance with International Agreements

Why do some states comply with international agreements while others flout them? In this article, I introduce a previously unconsidered explanation: bureaucratic structure. I develop a rational choice model examining the impact of bureaucratic structure on compliance, suggesting that the existence of several distinct bureaucracies can mute compliance with an international agreement by insulating some bureaucrats from pressure to comply. I examine this theory through newly coded data on a 2001 OECD agreement designed to decrease the percentage of aid that is “tied” to donor-state products and services—a practice that is popular among special interests but which decreases foreign aid's effectiveness. I find that non–development-oriented bureaucracies, such as departments of interior, labor, and energy, were significantly less likely to comply with the agreement than traditional development bureaucracies. This aggregates to the state level as well, where states with many aid agencies were less compliant than states with a streamlined bureaucracy.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
9.30
自引率
2.40%
发文量
61
期刊介绍: The American Journal of Political Science (AJPS) publishes research in all major areas of political science including American politics, public policy, international relations, comparative politics, political methodology, and political theory. Founded in 1956, the AJPS publishes articles that make outstanding contributions to scholarly knowledge about notable theoretical concerns, puzzles or controversies in any subfield of political science.
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