意图冲突的问题是一个真正的问题吗?对gÓmez-torrente“参考之路”的几点评论

IF 0.2 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Manuscrito Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI:10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.fm
Filipe Martone
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在这篇简短的讨论中,我试图提供一些支持所谓的指示语简单意图理论的考虑,这是Gómez-Torrente所拒绝的。我试图表明,反对简单意图理论的主要论点似乎是基于错误的数据。
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IS THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICTING INTENTIONS A GENUINE PROBLEM? SOME REMARKS ON GÓMEZ-TORRENTE´S “ROADS TO REFERENCE”
: In this brief discussion piece I try to offer some considerations in favor of the so-called Simple Intention Theory of demonstratives, which is rejected by Gómez-Torrente. I try to show that the main argument offered against the Simple Intention Theory appears to be based on false data.
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来源期刊
Manuscrito
Manuscrito PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
31
审稿时长
32 weeks
期刊介绍: Information not localized
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