如果没有永恒的理性规范，为什么看起来有？

Pub Date : 2019-04-02 DOI:10.11612/RESPHIL.1721

Ryan Doody

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引用次数: 2

摘要

我解释了为什么某些决策序列让我们觉得不合理，而另一些则不然。我认为，我们一直渴望讲述关于自己的奉承但似是而非的故事，而那些让我们觉得不合理的历时性行为是那些你有机会隐藏一些不讨好的东西却没有做到的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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If There Are No Diachronic Norms of Rationality, Why Does It Seem Like There Are?

I offer an explanation for why certain sequences of decisions strike us as irrational while others do not. I argue that we have a standing desire to tell flattering yet plausible narratives about ourselves, and that cases of diachronic behavior that strike us as irrational are those in which you had the opportunity to hide something unflattering and failed to do so.

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