{"title":"The Last Word on Emergence","authors":"J. Heil","doi":"10.11612/resphil.2302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2302","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64518108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/resphilosophica202351697
T. Haze
{"title":"Modal Inertness and the Zombie Argument in advance","authors":"T. Haze","doi":"10.5840/resphilosophica202351697","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/resphilosophica202351697","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71233145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/resphilosophica202368100
D. Mezzadri
In this article I engage with a recent debate vis-à-vis Kant’s conception of logic, which deals with whether Kant saw logical laws as normative for, or rather as constitutive of, the faculty of understanding. On the former view, logical laws provide norms for the correct exercise of the understanding; on the latter, they define the necessary structure of the faculty of understanding per se. I claim that these two positions are not mutually exclusive, as Kant held both a normative and a constitutive conception of logic. I also sketch a parallelism between Kant’s conceptions of logic and of ethics: Kant’s twofold conception of logic parallels his view of moral laws as normative (for the human will) but constitutive (of a holy will).
{"title":"Kant on the Nature of Logical and Moral Laws","authors":"D. Mezzadri","doi":"10.5840/resphilosophica202368100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/resphilosophica202368100","url":null,"abstract":"In this article I engage with a recent debate vis-à-vis Kant’s conception of logic, which deals with whether Kant saw logical laws as normative for, or rather as constitutive of, the faculty of understanding. On the former view, logical laws provide norms for the correct exercise of the understanding; on the latter, they define the necessary structure of the faculty of understanding per se. I claim that these two positions are not mutually exclusive, as Kant held both a normative and a constitutive conception of logic. I also sketch a parallelism between Kant’s conceptions of logic and of ethics: Kant’s twofold conception of logic parallels his view of moral laws as normative (for the human will) but constitutive (of a holy will).","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71233323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/resphilosophica202373101
Alexander T. Englert
{"title":"Kant’s Favorite Argument for Our Immortality in advance","authors":"Alexander T. Englert","doi":"10.5840/resphilosophica202373101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/resphilosophica202373101","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71233349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/resphilosophica2023929106
David B. Hershenov
The Rational Substance View is a pro-life position which maintains that all humans are moral equals and have a right to life in virtue of their kind membership. Healthy embryos, newborns, children, adults, and as the cognitively impaired all essentially have a root or radical capacity for rationality, though it may not be developed or have its operations blocked. Their being substances with a rational nature is the basis of their moral status and what makes it wrong to kill them. I will argue that the view is committed to some bad biology, and suspect metaphysics, and is unable to escape all the reductios of potentiality. I will offer the Healthy Development View as an alternative to the Rational Substance View. It is a pro-life view that avoids the problematic biology and metaphysics and reductios of potentiality. It understands our rational development to be a contingent rather than an essential trait.
{"title":"An Alternative to the Rational Substance Pro-life View in advance","authors":"David B. Hershenov","doi":"10.5840/resphilosophica2023929106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/resphilosophica2023929106","url":null,"abstract":"The Rational Substance View is a pro-life position which maintains that all humans are moral equals and have a right to life in virtue of their kind membership. Healthy embryos, newborns, children, adults, and as the cognitively impaired all essentially have a root or radical capacity for rationality, though it may not be developed or have its operations blocked. Their being substances with a rational nature is the basis of their moral status and what makes it wrong to kill them. I will argue that the view is committed to some bad biology, and suspect metaphysics, and is unable to escape all the reductios of potentiality. I will offer the Healthy Development View as an alternative to the Rational Substance View. It is a pro-life view that avoids the problematic biology and metaphysics and reductios of potentiality. It understands our rational development to be a contingent rather than an essential trait.","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135953620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/resphilosophica2023928102
Jacob Stegenga, Tarun Menon
The value-free ideal for science holds that values should not influence the core features of scientific reasoning. We defend the difference-to-inference model of value-permeation, which holds that value-permeation in science is problematic when values make a difference to the inferences made about a hypothesis. This view of value-permeation is superior to existing views, and it suggests a corresponding maxim—namely, that scientists should strive to eliminate differences to inference. This maxim is the basis of a novel value-free ideal for science.
{"title":"The Difference-to-Interference Model for Values in Science in advance","authors":"Jacob Stegenga, Tarun Menon","doi":"10.5840/resphilosophica2023928102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/resphilosophica2023928102","url":null,"abstract":"The value-free ideal for science holds that values should not influence the core features of scientific reasoning. We defend the difference-to-inference model of value-permeation, which holds that value-permeation in science is problematic when values make a difference to the inferences made about a hypothesis. This view of value-permeation is superior to existing views, and it suggests a corresponding maxim—namely, that scientists should strive to eliminate differences to inference. This maxim is the basis of a novel value-free ideal for science.","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135914244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Thomas Aquinas on Malice: Three Interpretive Errors","authors":"Renate Fehr","doi":"10.11612/resphil.2239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2239","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64517571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/resphilosophica2023928103
S. Matthew Liao
Most people think that, other things being equal, you are at liberty to decide for yourself whether to have children. However, there are some people, aptly called anti-natalists, who believe that it is always morally wrong to have children. Anti-natalists are attracted to at least two types of arguments. According to the Positives Are Irrelevant Argument, unless a life contains no negative things at all, it is irrelevant that life also contains positive things. According to the Positives Are Insufficient Argument, while life does contain some positive things, as a matter of fact, almost everyone’s life contains more negative things than positive things. In this article, I first offer new reasons to reject these arguments. I then offer a positive, human rights account of why not only is it not wrong to bring people into existence, but parents in fact have a human right to do so.
{"title":"A Right Response to Anti-Natalism in advance","authors":"S. Matthew Liao","doi":"10.5840/resphilosophica2023928103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/resphilosophica2023928103","url":null,"abstract":"Most people think that, other things being equal, you are at liberty to decide for yourself whether to have children. However, there are some people, aptly called anti-natalists, who believe that it is always morally wrong to have children. Anti-natalists are attracted to at least two types of arguments. According to the Positives Are Irrelevant Argument, unless a life contains no negative things at all, it is irrelevant that life also contains positive things. According to the Positives Are Insufficient Argument, while life does contain some positive things, as a matter of fact, almost everyone’s life contains more negative things than positive things. In this article, I first offer new reasons to reject these arguments. I then offer a positive, human rights account of why not only is it not wrong to bring people into existence, but parents in fact have a human right to do so.","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135953340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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