领导启发式

IF 2.5 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI:10.1016/j.joep.2023.102661
Carina Cavalcanti , Philip J. Grossman , Elias L. Khalil
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引用次数: 1

摘要

经济学文献提供了至少两种主要的解释,来解释为什么个人会接受启发式的领导建议:首先,领导者拥有与手头任务相关的信息或才能;其次,领导者的建议有助于减少不确定性,并在一个选择上协调团队。心理学文献提供了另一种解释:领导者作为“道德榜样”,有助于提高工作满意度、绩效和亲社会行为。这两种文学流派虽然方式不同,但都假定追随者有理性的选择。两篇文献都没有解决这个问题:如果领导者缺乏任何相关信息、人才优势、道德品质或其他可取的品质,人们会采用领导启发式吗?我们报告的实验证据表明,答案是肯定的。在我们的实验中,领导者提出公平的“抛硬币”的结果。领导者在(不相关的)“信息”和(不相关的)“能力”上各不相同。虽然在每个周期后都没有反馈,但我们发现参与者的所有决策中有三分之一是启发式地遵循领导者的选择。这是令人惊讶的,因为首先,领导者的选择是无关的,其次,遵循它会减少回报。与不相关的有才能的领导者相比,信息不相关的领导者更容易选择降低收益的科目。至关重要的是,我们还表明,这些发现并不是由于缺乏对随机事件的理解而产生的。简而言之,无论是热手和赌徒的谬论,还是可能激发信任/忠诚的属性,都不能解释受试者的选择。
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Leadership heuristic

The economics literature offers at least two main explanations of why individuals adopt the heuristic of following their leader’s suggestion: First, the leader has information or a talent relevant to the task at hand and, second, the leader’s suggestion helps to reduce uncertainty and to coordinate the group on one choice. The psychology literature offers another explanation: The leader, acting as an “ethical example,” helps to increase job satisfaction, performance, and prosocial behavior. Both lines of literature, although in different ways, assume rational choice on the part of followers. Neither literature addresses the question: Would people adopt the leadership heuristic if the leader lacks any relevant information, talent advantage, ethical character, or other desirable traits? We report experimental evidence that suggests the answer is yes. In our experiment, leaders suggest the outcome of a fair “coin toss.” Leaders vary in (irrelevant) “information” and (irrelevant) “ability” possessed. Although there is no feedback after each period, we find that one-third of all the decisions of the participants heuristically follow the leader’s choice. This is surprising given that, first, the leader’s choice is irrelevant and, second, to follow it would be payoff-reducing. Payoff-reducing choices of subjects are more frequent with irrelevantly informed leaders than with irrelevantly talented leaders. Crucially, we also show that the findings are not driven by lack of understanding of random events. In short, neither the hot-hand and gambler’s fallacies nor attributes that might inspire trust/loyalty can explain subjects’ choices.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.20
自引率
31.40%
发文量
69
审稿时长
63 days
期刊介绍: The Journal aims to present research that will improve understanding of behavioral, in particular psychological, aspects of economic phenomena and processes. The Journal seeks to be a channel for the increased interest in using behavioral science methods for the study of economic behavior, and so to contribute to better solutions of societal problems, by stimulating new approaches and new theorizing about economic affairs. Economic psychology as a discipline studies the psychological mechanisms that underlie economic behavior. It deals with preferences, judgments, choices, economic interaction, and factors influencing these, as well as the consequences of judgements and decisions for economic processes and phenomena. This includes the impact of economic institutions upon human behavior and well-being. Studies in economic psychology may relate to different levels of aggregation, from the household and the individual consumer to the macro level of whole nations. Economic behavior in connection with inflation, unemployment, taxation, economic development, as well as consumer information and economic behavior in the market place are thus among the fields of interest. The journal also encourages submissions dealing with social interaction in economic contexts, like bargaining, negotiation, or group decision-making. The Journal of Economic Psychology contains: (a) novel reports of empirical (including: experimental) research on economic behavior; (b) replications studies; (c) assessments of the state of the art in economic psychology; (d) articles providing a theoretical perspective or a frame of reference for the study of economic behavior; (e) articles explaining the implications of theoretical developments for practical applications; (f) book reviews; (g) announcements of meetings, conferences and seminars.
期刊最新文献
Editorial Board Gender effects for loss aversion: A reconsideration A meta analysis of lost-letter field experiments Gender identity, salience of information, and tacit coordination: Gender differences in response to strategic uncertainty Pay all subjects or pay only some? An experiment on decision-making under risk and ambiguity
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