Carina Cavalcanti , Philip J. Grossman , Elias L. Khalil
{"title":"领导启发式","authors":"Carina Cavalcanti , Philip J. Grossman , Elias L. Khalil","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102661","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The economics literature offers at least two main explanations of why individuals adopt the heuristic of following their leader’s suggestion: First, the leader has information or a talent relevant to the task at hand and, second, the leader’s suggestion helps to reduce uncertainty and to coordinate the group on one choice. The psychology literature offers another explanation: The leader, acting as an “ethical example,” helps to increase job satisfaction, performance, and prosocial behavior. Both lines of literature, although in different ways, assume rational choice on the part of followers. Neither literature addresses the question: Would people adopt the leadership heuristic if the leader lacks any relevant information, talent advantage, ethical character, or other desirable traits? We report experimental evidence that suggests the answer is yes. In our experiment, leaders suggest the outcome of a fair “coin toss.” Leaders vary in (irrelevant) “information” and (irrelevant) “ability” possessed. Although there is no feedback after each period, we find that one-third of all the decisions of the participants heuristically follow the leader’s choice. This is surprising given that, first, the leader’s choice is irrelevant and, second, to follow it would be payoff-reducing. Payoff-reducing choices of subjects are more frequent with irrelevantly informed leaders than with irrelevantly talented leaders. Crucially, we also show that the findings are not driven by lack of understanding of random events. In short, neither the hot-hand and gambler’s fallacies nor attributes that might inspire trust/loyalty can explain subjects’ choices.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"98 ","pages":"Article 102661"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Leadership heuristic\",\"authors\":\"Carina Cavalcanti , Philip J. Grossman , Elias L. Khalil\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.joep.2023.102661\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>The economics literature offers at least two main explanations of why individuals adopt the heuristic of following their leader’s suggestion: First, the leader has information or a talent relevant to the task at hand and, second, the leader’s suggestion helps to reduce uncertainty and to coordinate the group on one choice. The psychology literature offers another explanation: The leader, acting as an “ethical example,” helps to increase job satisfaction, performance, and prosocial behavior. Both lines of literature, although in different ways, assume rational choice on the part of followers. Neither literature addresses the question: Would people adopt the leadership heuristic if the leader lacks any relevant information, talent advantage, ethical character, or other desirable traits? We report experimental evidence that suggests the answer is yes. In our experiment, leaders suggest the outcome of a fair “coin toss.” Leaders vary in (irrelevant) “information” and (irrelevant) “ability” possessed. Although there is no feedback after each period, we find that one-third of all the decisions of the participants heuristically follow the leader’s choice. This is surprising given that, first, the leader’s choice is irrelevant and, second, to follow it would be payoff-reducing. Payoff-reducing choices of subjects are more frequent with irrelevantly informed leaders than with irrelevantly talented leaders. Crucially, we also show that the findings are not driven by lack of understanding of random events. In short, neither the hot-hand and gambler’s fallacies nor attributes that might inspire trust/loyalty can explain subjects’ choices.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48318,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Economic Psychology\",\"volume\":\"98 \",\"pages\":\"Article 102661\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Economic Psychology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487023000624\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Economic Psychology","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487023000624","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
The economics literature offers at least two main explanations of why individuals adopt the heuristic of following their leader’s suggestion: First, the leader has information or a talent relevant to the task at hand and, second, the leader’s suggestion helps to reduce uncertainty and to coordinate the group on one choice. The psychology literature offers another explanation: The leader, acting as an “ethical example,” helps to increase job satisfaction, performance, and prosocial behavior. Both lines of literature, although in different ways, assume rational choice on the part of followers. Neither literature addresses the question: Would people adopt the leadership heuristic if the leader lacks any relevant information, talent advantage, ethical character, or other desirable traits? We report experimental evidence that suggests the answer is yes. In our experiment, leaders suggest the outcome of a fair “coin toss.” Leaders vary in (irrelevant) “information” and (irrelevant) “ability” possessed. Although there is no feedback after each period, we find that one-third of all the decisions of the participants heuristically follow the leader’s choice. This is surprising given that, first, the leader’s choice is irrelevant and, second, to follow it would be payoff-reducing. Payoff-reducing choices of subjects are more frequent with irrelevantly informed leaders than with irrelevantly talented leaders. Crucially, we also show that the findings are not driven by lack of understanding of random events. In short, neither the hot-hand and gambler’s fallacies nor attributes that might inspire trust/loyalty can explain subjects’ choices.
期刊介绍:
The Journal aims to present research that will improve understanding of behavioral, in particular psychological, aspects of economic phenomena and processes. The Journal seeks to be a channel for the increased interest in using behavioral science methods for the study of economic behavior, and so to contribute to better solutions of societal problems, by stimulating new approaches and new theorizing about economic affairs. Economic psychology as a discipline studies the psychological mechanisms that underlie economic behavior. It deals with preferences, judgments, choices, economic interaction, and factors influencing these, as well as the consequences of judgements and decisions for economic processes and phenomena. This includes the impact of economic institutions upon human behavior and well-being. Studies in economic psychology may relate to different levels of aggregation, from the household and the individual consumer to the macro level of whole nations. Economic behavior in connection with inflation, unemployment, taxation, economic development, as well as consumer information and economic behavior in the market place are thus among the fields of interest. The journal also encourages submissions dealing with social interaction in economic contexts, like bargaining, negotiation, or group decision-making. The Journal of Economic Psychology contains: (a) novel reports of empirical (including: experimental) research on economic behavior; (b) replications studies; (c) assessments of the state of the art in economic psychology; (d) articles providing a theoretical perspective or a frame of reference for the study of economic behavior; (e) articles explaining the implications of theoretical developments for practical applications; (f) book reviews; (g) announcements of meetings, conferences and seminars.