SIPO II: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE?

This review essay offers an assessment of the 'harmonised' (elsewhere called 'revised') Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO) of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). (1)) Informally known as SIPO II, it succeeds the original Strategic Indicative Plan, adopted in 2004 for a five-year period. Following a lengthy review process, SIPO II was approved by the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Windhoek, Namibia, in August 2010. It was finally publicly launched in November 2012, but as of mid-2103, implementation appears to be lagging. Although Southern Africa has had many years' experience of fighting colonialism and apartheid, formal inter-state cooperation in the area of peace and security is a relatively new phenomenon. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), established in 1980, turned into SADC in 1994. In 1996, the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government established the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC). In 2001, Heads of State and Government signed the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, which provided an institutional framework for cooperation by member states in these areas. In 2002, the SADC Summit mandated the OPDSC to prepare a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) which would provide guidelines for implementing the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation over the next five years. The achievements under the SIPO include the establishment of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact, launch of the SADC Standby Force (SSF), integration of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) into the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), establishment of the Regional Early Warning Centre as well as the SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) and a mediation unit (SADC 2010). However, SIPO I was also poorly implemented in numerous respects. In particular, the production of a business plan for addressing its 130-plus objectives never materialised, and no serious effort was made to develop strategies for operationalising the Organ. Critically, the relationship between the SADC Secretariat and the member states is key to SADC's effective functioning, and needs to be driven by visionary leadership. The SSF, although technically committed to the AU's grand strategy of having standby forces ready for deployment (by 2015--a new deadline), remains resource-poor and depends on political guidance at Summit level. It is unclear whether there is any real political will to use this instrument in a robust fashion beyond fact-finding and mediation by retired presidents. Despite prescriptions to this effect in the Protocol, SADC's security architecture does not necessarily harmonise with that of the AU, giving rise to a range of tensions, not least of which the question of agenda-setting (who determines action, when, and how?) and deployment authorisation (which body decides to deploy whom, at what level, and with what mandate and accountability?). (2))--A number of policy questions can be identified: 1. Which Themes, Norms and Principles Guide SIPO II? SIPO II is not meant to be a binding policy document or legal framework for decision-makers--the SADC Treaty and the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation play that role (Oosthuizen 2006). As SADC officials and security sector officers often note, it should rather be understood as a guide to collective behaviour. Both SIPO I, and SIPO II state that they are guided by the "objectives and common agenda" of SADC, as elaborated in Article 5 of its amended Treaty. (3)) In brief, SADC regards good political and economic governance as the two key 'enablers' of regional integration. (4)) Article 5 of the Treaty requires member states to "promote common political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions that are democratic, legitimate, and effective". …