{"title":"条件结构:国际谈判合作的心理学理论","authors":"Rachel Xian","doi":"10.1163/15718069-BJA10025","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nPolitical psychology and social constructivism exist in an “ideational alliance” against realism; however, both have overlooked behavioral conditioning, the basis of animal learning. Through six stages situated in international negotiation behaviors, the theory of Conditioning Constructs shows how behavioral conditioning can take parties from specific to diffuse reciprocity, rationalist to constructivist cooperation, and crisis to durable peace. In stages 1, 2 and 3, parties use negotiated agreements to exit prisoner’s dilemmas, continuously reinforce cooperation during agreement implementation, and satiate to rewards as initial implementation finalizes. In stages 4, 5 and 6, parties receive fresh rewards with new negotiations, undergo intermittent reinforcement with periodic agreements thereafter, and finally attribute cooperative behavior to actor constructs. Conditioning Constructs demonstrates that agency is possible in socially constructed structures through willful participation in conditioning through negotiation; and that, while Anatol Rapoport’s tit-for-tat strategy is suited to initial cooperation, intermittent reinforcement better preserves late-stage cooperation.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":"26 1","pages":"319-356"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2021-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Conditioning Constructs: A Psychological Theory of International Negotiated Cooperation\",\"authors\":\"Rachel Xian\",\"doi\":\"10.1163/15718069-BJA10025\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\nPolitical psychology and social constructivism exist in an “ideational alliance” against realism; however, both have overlooked behavioral conditioning, the basis of animal learning. Through six stages situated in international negotiation behaviors, the theory of Conditioning Constructs shows how behavioral conditioning can take parties from specific to diffuse reciprocity, rationalist to constructivist cooperation, and crisis to durable peace. In stages 1, 2 and 3, parties use negotiated agreements to exit prisoner’s dilemmas, continuously reinforce cooperation during agreement implementation, and satiate to rewards as initial implementation finalizes. In stages 4, 5 and 6, parties receive fresh rewards with new negotiations, undergo intermittent reinforcement with periodic agreements thereafter, and finally attribute cooperative behavior to actor constructs. Conditioning Constructs demonstrates that agency is possible in socially constructed structures through willful participation in conditioning through negotiation; and that, while Anatol Rapoport’s tit-for-tat strategy is suited to initial cooperation, intermittent reinforcement better preserves late-stage cooperation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45224,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice\",\"volume\":\"26 1\",\"pages\":\"319-356\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-04-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10025\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10025","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Conditioning Constructs: A Psychological Theory of International Negotiated Cooperation
Political psychology and social constructivism exist in an “ideational alliance” against realism; however, both have overlooked behavioral conditioning, the basis of animal learning. Through six stages situated in international negotiation behaviors, the theory of Conditioning Constructs shows how behavioral conditioning can take parties from specific to diffuse reciprocity, rationalist to constructivist cooperation, and crisis to durable peace. In stages 1, 2 and 3, parties use negotiated agreements to exit prisoner’s dilemmas, continuously reinforce cooperation during agreement implementation, and satiate to rewards as initial implementation finalizes. In stages 4, 5 and 6, parties receive fresh rewards with new negotiations, undergo intermittent reinforcement with periodic agreements thereafter, and finally attribute cooperative behavior to actor constructs. Conditioning Constructs demonstrates that agency is possible in socially constructed structures through willful participation in conditioning through negotiation; and that, while Anatol Rapoport’s tit-for-tat strategy is suited to initial cooperation, intermittent reinforcement better preserves late-stage cooperation.
期刊介绍:
International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice examines negotiation from many perspectives, to explore its theoretical foundations and to promote its practical application. It addresses the processes of negotiation relating to political, security, environmental, ethnic, economic, business, legal, scientific and cultural issues and conflicts among nations, international and regional organisations, multinational corporations and other non-state parties. Conceptually, the Journal confronts the difficult task of developing interdisciplinary theories and models of the negotiation process and its desired outcome.