Inwiefern ist der Begriff der Person für die biomedizinische Ethik hilfreich?

In biomedical ethics, the concept of person plays a major role in the discussion of ethically appropriate relationships with early human beings. The debate over abortion is one such case. There is still a heated debate over whether a fetus is already a person. However, because of the structure of the argument, the debate over the moral status of the fetus quickly becomes all-or-nothing. Against this background, I would like to address the question of to what extent the concept of person can be helpful in biomedical ethics. I argue that this concept is not useful for ethically appropriate interactions with early human beings, but it is useful for ethically appropriate interactions with human beings at the end of life. I demonstrate my thesis with reference to the argument about euthanasia. The concept of person plays a crucial role in understanding what it means to respect the autonomy of a person who desires euthanasia.