公民团结与个人主权:一个新的视角

IF 0.9 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2022-12-01 DOI:10.1016/j.irle.2022.106099
Uriel Procaccia , Eyal Winter
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引用次数: 1

摘要

近年来,超级政治行动委员会通过向政党和候选人提供大笔捐款来介入政治斗争,从而使政治结果倾向于符合他们的议程。超级政治行动委员会从个人和公司筹集资金,并将其用于宣传自己的事业。许多评论家研究了他们对美国政治格局的影响,并从宪法驱动的角度强调了其含义,以第一修正案的言论自由条款为基础,因为它适用于公司人员。在这篇文章中,我们从一个不同的角度来分析这一现象,即禁止花别人的钱来支持他们拒绝支持的事业。我们证明,尽管私人捐助者对超级政治行动委员会的捐款有时可能是合理的,但在大型公共公司捐款的情况下,这种补救措施是站不住脚的。造成这种扭曲的原因是,通过采用公司事务中现行的“一股一票”决策规则,邀请公司确定其假定的政治偏好,该规则将不成比例的权力分配给大量股份的持有者。由于政治争议应该由另一种决策规则——“一人一票”来治理,这种扭曲无法通过企业参与者的中介来弥补。
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Citizens united and individual sovereignty: A fresh perspective

In recent years super-PACs jumped into the political fray by making significant donations to political parties and candidates thus tilting political outcomes to suit their agendas. Super-PACs raise their money from individuals and corporations and spend it to promote their cause. Numerous commentators studied their impact on the American political landscape and highlighted its implications from a constitutionally driven perspective, anchored in the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment as it applies to corporate persons. In this Essay we analyze the phenomenon from a different vantage point, the prohibition to spend other people’s money in support of a cause which they refuse to endorse. We prove that although contributions made by private donors to super-PACs may sometimes be justified, no such redeeming grace is tenable in the case of contributions made by large public corporations. The distortion is caused by inviting corporations to identify their presumed political preferences by employing the decision rule current in corporate matters of “one share one vote” which allocates disproportionate power to the holders of large blocks of shares. Since political controversies ought to be governed by a different decision rule- “one person one vote” the distortion cannot be remedied through the intermediation of corporate players.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
18.20%
发文量
38
审稿时长
48 days
期刊介绍: The International Review of Law and Economics provides a forum for interdisciplinary research at the interface of law and economics. IRLE is international in scope and audience and particularly welcomes both theoretical and empirical papers on comparative law and economics, globalization and legal harmonization, and the endogenous emergence of legal institutions, in addition to more traditional legal topics.
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