{"title":"值得一提的是:采掘业透明度倡议对投资者来说是一个可信的信号机制吗?","authors":"J. Fraser","doi":"10.1017/S1355770X21000358","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper seeks to understand the link between resource governance and investor expectations in resource-rich countries. We test whether voluntary membership in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a public-private partnership that promotes transparency and accountability in the extractives sector, behaves as a credible signalling mechanism to investors that governments in resource-rich countries can manage resource revenue and adhere to sustainable fiscal policies in the medium and long run. Using an interrupted time series analysis coupled with a fixed effects model, we examine whether investor expectations on the price of sovereign debt behave as a credible signalling mechanism in the presence of certain conditions. Results indicate that in some cases there is a significant change in spread on the default price of sovereign debt as a result of announcement of either EITI candidacy or EITI compliance. However, it is clear that EITI membership alone is not a sufficient signal to investors that a country can effectively manage its resource revenues in the long run because the result of EITI implementation is heavily influenced by country-specific conditions.","PeriodicalId":47751,"journal":{"name":"Environment and Development Economics","volume":"27 1","pages":"436 - 450"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2021-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Worth its weight in gold: is the extractive industries transparency initiative a credible signalling mechanism to investors?\",\"authors\":\"J. Fraser\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/S1355770X21000358\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract This paper seeks to understand the link between resource governance and investor expectations in resource-rich countries. We test whether voluntary membership in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a public-private partnership that promotes transparency and accountability in the extractives sector, behaves as a credible signalling mechanism to investors that governments in resource-rich countries can manage resource revenue and adhere to sustainable fiscal policies in the medium and long run. Using an interrupted time series analysis coupled with a fixed effects model, we examine whether investor expectations on the price of sovereign debt behave as a credible signalling mechanism in the presence of certain conditions. Results indicate that in some cases there is a significant change in spread on the default price of sovereign debt as a result of announcement of either EITI candidacy or EITI compliance. However, it is clear that EITI membership alone is not a sufficient signal to investors that a country can effectively manage its resource revenues in the long run because the result of EITI implementation is heavily influenced by country-specific conditions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47751,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Environment and Development Economics\",\"volume\":\"27 1\",\"pages\":\"436 - 450\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-11-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Environment and Development Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X21000358\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Environment and Development Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X21000358","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Worth its weight in gold: is the extractive industries transparency initiative a credible signalling mechanism to investors?
Abstract This paper seeks to understand the link between resource governance and investor expectations in resource-rich countries. We test whether voluntary membership in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a public-private partnership that promotes transparency and accountability in the extractives sector, behaves as a credible signalling mechanism to investors that governments in resource-rich countries can manage resource revenue and adhere to sustainable fiscal policies in the medium and long run. Using an interrupted time series analysis coupled with a fixed effects model, we examine whether investor expectations on the price of sovereign debt behave as a credible signalling mechanism in the presence of certain conditions. Results indicate that in some cases there is a significant change in spread on the default price of sovereign debt as a result of announcement of either EITI candidacy or EITI compliance. However, it is clear that EITI membership alone is not a sufficient signal to investors that a country can effectively manage its resource revenues in the long run because the result of EITI implementation is heavily influenced by country-specific conditions.
期刊介绍:
Environment and Development Economics is positioned at the intersection of environmental, resource and development economics. The Editor and Associate Editors, supported by a distinguished panel of advisors from around the world, aim to encourage submissions from researchers in the field in both developed and developing countries. The Journal is divided into two main sections, Theory and Applications, which includes regular academic papers and Policy Options, which includes papers that may be of interest to the wider policy community. Environment and Development Economics also publishes occasional Policy Fora (discussions based on a focal paper). From time to time the journal publishes special issues based on a particular theme.