银行-金融科技合作伙伴关系、外包安排以及导师制度的案例

IF 0.9 Q2 LAW Capital Markets Law Journal Pub Date : 2020-12-03 DOI:10.1093/cmlj/kmaa019
L. Enriques, W. Ringe
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引用次数: 4

摘要

金融科技公司曾经被视为传统银行业的“颠覆者”,现在越来越被视为老牌金融机构的有吸引力的合作伙伴。此类合作协议有不同的形式和背景,但大多数协议的共同目标是外包关键的银行职能,促进新的市场参与者进入市场,同时克服相对困难的监管障碍。然而,这种安排虽然普遍受到欢迎,但也带来了一些监管问题,特别是在对在监管机构直接权限之外运营的金融科技进行有效监管方面。执法和有效监管问题出现,最终可能导致市场稳定和系统性风险问题。监管沙盒代表了解决这些问题的一种尝试,但可能无法做到这一点,而且往往无效或不可用。其他类似的解决方案,如金融科技特许公司和伞式公司,可能会有所帮助,但同样,也提供了一个不完美的解决方案。在这种背景下,我们提出了“导师制”的理由,该制度为金融科技公司和老牌银行之间的合作协议提供了可靠的监管框架。这将允许一个事实上的“私人沙盒”,经验丰富的公司可以在这里指导新的创业公司,帮助他们应对复杂的监管过程。与此同时,国家支持的指导计划将澄清责任分配、监督权限和责任问题,从而克服套利和滥用问题。最终,导师制可能会为未来建立一个新的、更可靠的银行体系指明道路,使外包银行服务的既定合同实践更加可靠。
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Bank–fintech partnerships, outsourcing arrangements and the case for a mentorship regime
Fintech firms, once seen as ‘disruptors’ of the traditional banking world, are now increasingly seen as attractive partners for established financial institutions. Such partnership agreements come in different forms and contexts, but most share the goals of outsourcing key banking functions and facilitating market entry for new market players while overcoming relatively tough regulatory hurdles. Yet such arrangements, while generally to be welcomed, pose a number of regulatory problems, in particular concerning the effective supervision of fintechs that operate outside of the direct purview of regulatory authorities. Questions of enforcement and effective supervision emerge, which may ultimately result in problems regarding market stability and systemic risk. Regulatory sandboxes represent one attempt to address these problems but may fail to do so and are often ineffective or unavailable. Other similar solutions, such as fintech charters and umbrella firms, may help but, similarly, provide an imperfect solution. Against this backdrop, we make the case for a ‘mentorship regime’, which provides for a reliable regulatory framework for partnership agreements between fintech firms and established banks. This would allow for a de facto ‘private sandbox’ where experienced firms could mentor new startups and help them to cope with a complex regulatory process. At the same time, a state-backed mentorship plan would clear up the allocation of responsibilities, supervision competences, and liability questions and thus overcome problems of arbitrage and abuse. Ultimately, a mentorship regime may show the way to a new and more reliable future system of banking, making the well-stablished contractual practice of outsourcing banking services more reliable.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
21
期刊介绍: This journal is essential for all serious capital markets practitioners and for academics with an interest in this growing field around the World. It is the first periodical to focus entirely on aspects related to capital markets for lawyers and covers all of the fields within this practice area: Debt; Derivatives; Equity; High Yield Products; Securitisation; and Repackaging. With an international perspective, each issue covers articles and news relevant to the financial centres in the US, Europe and Asia. The journal provides a mix of thoughtful and in-depth consideration of the law and practice of capital markets through analytical articles on topical issues written by leading practitioners and academics in the international arena. There are also articles on matters of best practice and opinion on legal and practice developments from around the world. In particular the journal offers: • Unique specialist coverage of international capital markets practice • High level of analysis for experienced lawyers and academics • Team of internationally respected editors from leading centres in the US, Europe and Asia • Quality of articles assured through peer review system.
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