宪法沉默之声:印度宪法第19条下的解释整体主义和言论自由

IF 0.3 Q3 LAW Statute Law Review Pub Date : 2020-07-07 DOI:10.1093/slr/hmaa012
R. Kohli
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引用次数: 0

摘要

与美国宪法第一修正案不同,印度宪法第19条明确列举了限制言论自由的8个理由。尽管是宪法解释的一个基本问题,但第19条是否规定了详尽的限制清单的问题在学术文献和印度法学中基本上被忽视了。关于言论自由条款范围的最新争论是考沙尔·基肖尔案,最高法院目前正在审理是否可以通过援引第19条以外的基本权利来限制言论的争论。本文试图通过挖掘印度宪法中关于基本权利之间关系的宪法沉默的含义,找到一个原则性的答案。它认为,严格的文本主义方法导致了一种独特形式的权利专制主义,这种专制主义在理论上既不连贯,又与印度法理学不一致。在考察最高法院的解释观点从严格的文本主义到解释整体主义的转变时,它发现,最高法院丰富的基本权利判例允许从第19条之外引入对言论的限制。这种方法也为解决言论自由问题的宪法裁决中的权利内、权利间和权利利益冲突提供了一个有意义的框架。
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The Sound of Constitutional Silences: Interpretive Holism and Free Speech under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution
Unlike the US First Amendment, Article 19 of the Indian Constitution expressly enumerates eight grounds on which free speech may be restricted. Despite being a fundamental issue of constitutional interpretation, the question of whether Article 19 provides for an exhaustive list of restrictions has largely been neglected in academic literature and Indian jurisprudence. The latest site of contestations on the scope of the free speech clause has been the case of Kaushal Kishor, where the Supreme Court is currently hearing arguments on whether speech can be restricted by invoking fundamental rights beyond Article 19. This Article seeks to develop a principled answer by excavating the meaning of constitutional silences on the relationships between fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution. It argues that a strict textualist approach leads to a distinct form of rights absolutism that is both doctrinally incoherent and inconsistent with Indian jurisprudence. Examining the shift in the Supreme Court’s interpretive outlook from strict textualism to interpretive holism, it finds that the Court’s rich fundamental rights jurisprudence allows importing restrictions on speech from beyond Article 19. Such an approach also provides a meaningful framework for resolving intra-right, inter-right, and right-interest conflicts in the constitutional adjudication of free speech issues.
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CiteScore
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0.00%
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期刊介绍: The principal objectives of the Review are to provide a vehicle for the consideration of the legislative process, the use of legislation as an instrument of public policy and of the drafting and interpretation of legislation. The Review, which was first established in 1980, is the only journal of its kind within the Commonwealth. It is of particular value to lawyers in both private practice and in public service, and to academics, both lawyers and political scientists, who write and teach within the field of legislation.
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