“不朽军团”:一个“泪流满面的节日”,一场死者的游行,还是一场大规模抗议?

I. Kurilla
{"title":"“不朽军团”:一个“泪流满面的节日”,一场死者的游行,还是一场大规模抗议?","authors":"I. Kurilla","doi":"10.1080/10611428.2021.2002043","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The history of the Great Patriotic War has become post-Soviet Russia’s universal language for political discussion and the only effective “bond.” As the most advantageous narrative from the perspective of the regime’s interests, it is this narrative of war that the Kremlin seeks to control above all. Memory of the war has been “appropriated” by the state, and the more freedom it has to manipulate this, the less veterans are able to challenge its triumphal mythmaking. However, the memory of war is, for most Russians, not limited to any official narrative in school texts, books, or films. For each family, it is also a family history, an object of pride, and a memory of tragedy. The state’s appropriation of the war and the pressure of “military-patriotic propaganda” have sparked resistance among a significant portion of society, along with a desire to affirm their own family memories. The “Immortal Regiment” was originally an attempt to seize power from the state monopoly and to assert the history of the war as a family history, one not inscribed in the state narrative alone, but that also subordinates the state narrative to family memory. Millions of Russians took to the streets to assert their right to history, the most powerful political statement in Russia’s entire post-Soviet history. The state has tried to paint the Immortal Regiment as a loyalist movement, because it speaks to the same topic that constitutes the core of the regime’s own political ideology, the Great Patriotic War. Meanwhile, it is clear even to the regime itself that this movement is discussing the war differently, in fact undermining the state’s interpretive monopoly on the military past and, consequently, its right to make political statements that exploit the theme of the war. It nevertheless remains too early to say whether the state has fully integrated this action into the propaganda mainstream. Furthermore, the power of the Immortal Regiment is even forcing propaganda to adapt to the demands of family and personal memory.","PeriodicalId":85479,"journal":{"name":"Russian social science review : a journal of translations","volume":"62 1","pages":"307 - 322"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The “Immortal Regiment”: A “Holiday Through Tears,” a Parade of the Dead, or a Mass Protest?\",\"authors\":\"I. Kurilla\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/10611428.2021.2002043\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT The history of the Great Patriotic War has become post-Soviet Russia’s universal language for political discussion and the only effective “bond.” As the most advantageous narrative from the perspective of the regime’s interests, it is this narrative of war that the Kremlin seeks to control above all. Memory of the war has been “appropriated” by the state, and the more freedom it has to manipulate this, the less veterans are able to challenge its triumphal mythmaking. However, the memory of war is, for most Russians, not limited to any official narrative in school texts, books, or films. For each family, it is also a family history, an object of pride, and a memory of tragedy. The state’s appropriation of the war and the pressure of “military-patriotic propaganda” have sparked resistance among a significant portion of society, along with a desire to affirm their own family memories. The “Immortal Regiment” was originally an attempt to seize power from the state monopoly and to assert the history of the war as a family history, one not inscribed in the state narrative alone, but that also subordinates the state narrative to family memory. Millions of Russians took to the streets to assert their right to history, the most powerful political statement in Russia’s entire post-Soviet history. The state has tried to paint the Immortal Regiment as a loyalist movement, because it speaks to the same topic that constitutes the core of the regime’s own political ideology, the Great Patriotic War. Meanwhile, it is clear even to the regime itself that this movement is discussing the war differently, in fact undermining the state’s interpretive monopoly on the military past and, consequently, its right to make political statements that exploit the theme of the war. It nevertheless remains too early to say whether the state has fully integrated this action into the propaganda mainstream. Furthermore, the power of the Immortal Regiment is even forcing propaganda to adapt to the demands of family and personal memory.\",\"PeriodicalId\":85479,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Russian social science review : a journal of translations\",\"volume\":\"62 1\",\"pages\":\"307 - 322\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-11-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Russian social science review : a journal of translations\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/10611428.2021.2002043\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Russian social science review : a journal of translations","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10611428.2021.2002043","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要伟大卫国战争的历史已经成为后苏联时代俄罗斯政治讨论的通用语言,也是唯一有效的“纽带”。作为从政权利益角度来看最有利的叙事,克里姆林宫最想控制的就是这种战争叙事。对战争的记忆被国家“侵占”了,国家操纵战争的自由度越高,退伍军人就越难挑战其胜利神话。然而,对大多数俄罗斯人来说,对战争的记忆并不局限于学校课本、书籍或电影中的任何官方叙事。对每个家庭来说,这也是一段家族历史,一个值得骄傲的对象,一个悲剧的记忆。国家对战争的挪用和“军事爱国宣传”的压力在社会的很大一部分人中引发了抵抗,同时也引发了肯定自己家庭记忆的愿望。“不朽军团”最初是试图从国家垄断中夺取权力,并将战争史视为家族史,这不是一部单独刻在国家叙事中的历史,而是一部将国家叙事置于家族记忆之下的历史。数百万俄罗斯人走上街头,维护他们的历史权利,这是俄罗斯整个后苏联历史上最有力的政治声明。国家试图将不朽军团描绘成一场忠诚的运动,因为它涉及的主题与该政权自身政治意识形态的核心——伟大卫国战争——相同。与此同时,即使是政权本身也很清楚,这场运动正在以不同的方式讨论战争,事实上破坏了国家对军事过去的解释垄断,从而破坏了国家发表利用战争主题的政治声明的权利。然而,现在说国家是否已经将这一行动完全纳入宣传主流还为时过早。此外,不朽军团的力量甚至迫使宣传适应家庭和个人记忆的需求。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
The “Immortal Regiment”: A “Holiday Through Tears,” a Parade of the Dead, or a Mass Protest?
ABSTRACT The history of the Great Patriotic War has become post-Soviet Russia’s universal language for political discussion and the only effective “bond.” As the most advantageous narrative from the perspective of the regime’s interests, it is this narrative of war that the Kremlin seeks to control above all. Memory of the war has been “appropriated” by the state, and the more freedom it has to manipulate this, the less veterans are able to challenge its triumphal mythmaking. However, the memory of war is, for most Russians, not limited to any official narrative in school texts, books, or films. For each family, it is also a family history, an object of pride, and a memory of tragedy. The state’s appropriation of the war and the pressure of “military-patriotic propaganda” have sparked resistance among a significant portion of society, along with a desire to affirm their own family memories. The “Immortal Regiment” was originally an attempt to seize power from the state monopoly and to assert the history of the war as a family history, one not inscribed in the state narrative alone, but that also subordinates the state narrative to family memory. Millions of Russians took to the streets to assert their right to history, the most powerful political statement in Russia’s entire post-Soviet history. The state has tried to paint the Immortal Regiment as a loyalist movement, because it speaks to the same topic that constitutes the core of the regime’s own political ideology, the Great Patriotic War. Meanwhile, it is clear even to the regime itself that this movement is discussing the war differently, in fact undermining the state’s interpretive monopoly on the military past and, consequently, its right to make political statements that exploit the theme of the war. It nevertheless remains too early to say whether the state has fully integrated this action into the propaganda mainstream. Furthermore, the power of the Immortal Regiment is even forcing propaganda to adapt to the demands of family and personal memory.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Economic Consequences of Changes in Russia’s Age Distribution During Demographic Waves The Population Replacement of Russia: Objectives, Trends, Factors, and Possible Outcomes by 2024 The Russian Intelligentsia and Russia’s Social Institutions: Trust or Alienation In This Issue: Existential Dilemmas What Is the State of Russian Society After 20 Years of Putin?
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1