{"title":"获得“正确的”同意:新南威尔士州的性侵犯法改革","authors":"Julia Quilter","doi":"10.1080/13200968.2021.1930434","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"For the purposes of rape/sexual assault, the preferred approach for pursuing modernisation in Australia has been to legislate a positive definition of consent as ‘free and voluntary agreement’. The absence of consent in this form has become the primary touchstone for the crime. And yet, despite multiple waves of progressive legislative reform, too few victims of sexual violence find justice in the criminal courts. This article questions whether prevailing statutory models of consent definition may be more problem than solution. Drawing on the work of Pateman and Gatens in particular, I argue that while the repetition of the words ‘free and voluntary agreement’ make it a familiar and reassuring formula, its meaning is neither self-evident nor self-executing. It is possible that the definition opens a ‘gap’ between what is intended by the phrase and how it is filled in practice by the ‘common knowledges’ (Mariana Valverde, Law's Dream of a Common Knowledge (Princeton University Press, 2003)) of rape myths. Myth as ‘misunderstanding’ may be capable of legislative correction, but legislative correction of myth, understood as an excess of signification (Roland Barthes, Mythologies trans A Lavers (Jonathan Cape, 1972)), is elusive. The article also suggests that the practice of legislative correction may be flawed to the extent that it relies on naming and marking the limit of what consent is not – via categories of (exceptional) circumstance and vulnerability.","PeriodicalId":43532,"journal":{"name":"Australian Feminist Law Journal","volume":"46 1","pages":"225 - 248"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13200968.2021.1930434","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Getting Consent ‘Right’: Sexual Assault Law Reform in New South Wales\",\"authors\":\"Julia Quilter\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/13200968.2021.1930434\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"For the purposes of rape/sexual assault, the preferred approach for pursuing modernisation in Australia has been to legislate a positive definition of consent as ‘free and voluntary agreement’. The absence of consent in this form has become the primary touchstone for the crime. And yet, despite multiple waves of progressive legislative reform, too few victims of sexual violence find justice in the criminal courts. This article questions whether prevailing statutory models of consent definition may be more problem than solution. Drawing on the work of Pateman and Gatens in particular, I argue that while the repetition of the words ‘free and voluntary agreement’ make it a familiar and reassuring formula, its meaning is neither self-evident nor self-executing. It is possible that the definition opens a ‘gap’ between what is intended by the phrase and how it is filled in practice by the ‘common knowledges’ (Mariana Valverde, Law's Dream of a Common Knowledge (Princeton University Press, 2003)) of rape myths. Myth as ‘misunderstanding’ may be capable of legislative correction, but legislative correction of myth, understood as an excess of signification (Roland Barthes, Mythologies trans A Lavers (Jonathan Cape, 1972)), is elusive. The article also suggests that the practice of legislative correction may be flawed to the extent that it relies on naming and marking the limit of what consent is not – via categories of (exceptional) circumstance and vulnerability.\",\"PeriodicalId\":43532,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Australian Feminist Law Journal\",\"volume\":\"46 1\",\"pages\":\"225 - 248\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-07-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13200968.2021.1930434\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Australian Feminist Law Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13200968.2021.1930434\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Australian Feminist Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13200968.2021.1930434","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
摘要
就强奸/性侵犯而言,澳大利亚追求现代化的首选方法是通过立法将同意积极定义为“自由和自愿的协议”。这种形式的未经同意已成为犯罪的主要试金石。然而,尽管进行了多次进步的立法改革,但在刑事法庭上寻求正义的性暴力受害者太少了。本文质疑是否现行的法定模式的同意定义可能是更多的问题而不是解决方案。我特别借鉴了Pateman和Gatens的著作,认为虽然“自由和自愿的协议”这个词的重复使它成为一个熟悉和令人安心的公式,但它的含义既不自明也不自动执行。很有可能,这个定义在这个短语的本意和强奸神话的“常识”(Mariana Valverde, Law’s Dream of a common Knowledge,普林斯顿大学出版社,2003)的实践中填补了它之间的“鸿沟”。作为“误解”的神话或许能够得到立法的纠正,但如果把神话的立法纠正理解为意义的过剩(罗兰·巴特,《跨拉弗斯的神话》(乔纳森·凯普,1972)),则难以捉摸。文章还指出,立法纠正的做法可能存在缺陷,因为它依赖于通过(例外)情况和脆弱性类别来命名和标记同意的限制。
Getting Consent ‘Right’: Sexual Assault Law Reform in New South Wales
For the purposes of rape/sexual assault, the preferred approach for pursuing modernisation in Australia has been to legislate a positive definition of consent as ‘free and voluntary agreement’. The absence of consent in this form has become the primary touchstone for the crime. And yet, despite multiple waves of progressive legislative reform, too few victims of sexual violence find justice in the criminal courts. This article questions whether prevailing statutory models of consent definition may be more problem than solution. Drawing on the work of Pateman and Gatens in particular, I argue that while the repetition of the words ‘free and voluntary agreement’ make it a familiar and reassuring formula, its meaning is neither self-evident nor self-executing. It is possible that the definition opens a ‘gap’ between what is intended by the phrase and how it is filled in practice by the ‘common knowledges’ (Mariana Valverde, Law's Dream of a Common Knowledge (Princeton University Press, 2003)) of rape myths. Myth as ‘misunderstanding’ may be capable of legislative correction, but legislative correction of myth, understood as an excess of signification (Roland Barthes, Mythologies trans A Lavers (Jonathan Cape, 1972)), is elusive. The article also suggests that the practice of legislative correction may be flawed to the extent that it relies on naming and marking the limit of what consent is not – via categories of (exceptional) circumstance and vulnerability.