{"title":"合法的寻租:哈萨克斯坦的土地征用权","authors":"M. Hanson","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/2czfb","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Kazakhstan ranks consistently low on measures of property rights protection and the rule of law more generally.1 Echoing these evaluations, existing literature emphasizes the degree to which informal institutions shape property relations in personalist, authoritarian regimes, like Kazakhstan. The expectation is that formal institutions like law and courts fail to restrain or otherwise influence state agents’ rent-seeking behavior. In effect, they serve primarily as ornamentation. Regardless, these explanations fail to explain why both citizens and the State regularly turn to these institutions to settle property disputes. This Article focuses on conflicts over eminent domain and finds that in these cases the law provides lower and upper bounds for officials’ rent-seeking behavior. Within these limits, law combines with informal practices to determine legal outcomes. Although the law and courts sometimes provide citizens with opportunities for limited redress, they also help facilitate and legitimize officials’ use of eminent domain for personal enrichment.","PeriodicalId":45714,"journal":{"name":"CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL","volume":"50 1","pages":"15-46"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Legalized rent-seeking: Eminent domain in Kazakhstan\",\"authors\":\"M. Hanson\",\"doi\":\"10.31228/osf.io/2czfb\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Kazakhstan ranks consistently low on measures of property rights protection and the rule of law more generally.1 Echoing these evaluations, existing literature emphasizes the degree to which informal institutions shape property relations in personalist, authoritarian regimes, like Kazakhstan. The expectation is that formal institutions like law and courts fail to restrain or otherwise influence state agents’ rent-seeking behavior. In effect, they serve primarily as ornamentation. Regardless, these explanations fail to explain why both citizens and the State regularly turn to these institutions to settle property disputes. This Article focuses on conflicts over eminent domain and finds that in these cases the law provides lower and upper bounds for officials’ rent-seeking behavior. Within these limits, law combines with informal practices to determine legal outcomes. Although the law and courts sometimes provide citizens with opportunities for limited redress, they also help facilitate and legitimize officials’ use of eminent domain for personal enrichment.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45714,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL\",\"volume\":\"50 1\",\"pages\":\"15-46\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/2czfb\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/2czfb","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Legalized rent-seeking: Eminent domain in Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan ranks consistently low on measures of property rights protection and the rule of law more generally.1 Echoing these evaluations, existing literature emphasizes the degree to which informal institutions shape property relations in personalist, authoritarian regimes, like Kazakhstan. The expectation is that formal institutions like law and courts fail to restrain or otherwise influence state agents’ rent-seeking behavior. In effect, they serve primarily as ornamentation. Regardless, these explanations fail to explain why both citizens and the State regularly turn to these institutions to settle property disputes. This Article focuses on conflicts over eminent domain and finds that in these cases the law provides lower and upper bounds for officials’ rent-seeking behavior. Within these limits, law combines with informal practices to determine legal outcomes. Although the law and courts sometimes provide citizens with opportunities for limited redress, they also help facilitate and legitimize officials’ use of eminent domain for personal enrichment.
期刊介绍:
Founded in 1967, the Cornell International Law Journal is one of the oldest and most prominent international law journals in the country. Three times a year, the Journal publishes scholarship that reflects the sweeping changes that are taking place in public and private international law. Two of the issues feature articles by legal scholars, practitioners, and participants in international politics as well as student-written notes. The third issue is dedicated to publishing papers generated by the Journal"s annual Symposium, held every spring in Ithaca, New York.