欧洲铁路竞争的不对称监管?

Q3 Business, Management and Accounting Competition and Regulation in Network Industries Pub Date : 2019-07-23 DOI:10.1177/1783591719861722
Juan J. Montero
{"title":"欧洲铁路竞争的不对称监管?","authors":"Juan J. Montero","doi":"10.1177/1783591719861722","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"There is an increasing number of voices calling for asymmetric regulation to reinforce competition in European railways as they are liberalized in December 2020. The regulatory framework defined in the Directives of the European Union (EU) might be insufficient to ensure effective and widespread competition. But the EU Directive declares tracks a natural monopoly, and structural measures in the form of vertical separation with transport activities have been imposed. Behavioral obligations have also been imposed on infrastructure managers in the form of access obligations. There is no room for asymmetry between competing networks, as tracks are a natural monopoly. Furthermore, as access conditions are ruled by the principle of nondiscrimination, it does not seem possible to introduce asymmetries in favor of newcomers, for instance in the form of access charges below the price charged to incumbent railway undertakings. For the rest of railway assets, which only exceptionally can be considered essential facilities, the EU Directives either impose no access obligations (rolling stock, drivers, ticketing systems) or when they impose access obligations (maintenance facilities), there is no formal asymmetry, as all undertakings are subject to the same access obligations. National regulatory authorities considering the introduction of asymmetric access obligations should take into account economic literature describing how asymmetries attract inefficient market entry, and they should consider that obligations introduced at a national level might fragment the Single European Railway Area.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719861722","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Asymmetric regulation for competition in European railways?\",\"authors\":\"Juan J. Montero\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/1783591719861722\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"There is an increasing number of voices calling for asymmetric regulation to reinforce competition in European railways as they are liberalized in December 2020. The regulatory framework defined in the Directives of the European Union (EU) might be insufficient to ensure effective and widespread competition. But the EU Directive declares tracks a natural monopoly, and structural measures in the form of vertical separation with transport activities have been imposed. Behavioral obligations have also been imposed on infrastructure managers in the form of access obligations. There is no room for asymmetry between competing networks, as tracks are a natural monopoly. Furthermore, as access conditions are ruled by the principle of nondiscrimination, it does not seem possible to introduce asymmetries in favor of newcomers, for instance in the form of access charges below the price charged to incumbent railway undertakings. For the rest of railway assets, which only exceptionally can be considered essential facilities, the EU Directives either impose no access obligations (rolling stock, drivers, ticketing systems) or when they impose access obligations (maintenance facilities), there is no formal asymmetry, as all undertakings are subject to the same access obligations. National regulatory authorities considering the introduction of asymmetric access obligations should take into account economic literature describing how asymmetries attract inefficient market entry, and they should consider that obligations introduced at a national level might fragment the Single European Railway Area.\",\"PeriodicalId\":38329,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-07-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719861722\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719861722\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"Business, Management and Accounting\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719861722","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Business, Management and Accounting","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6

摘要

随着2020年12月欧洲铁路的自由化,为了加强竞争,要求不对称规制的呼声越来越高。欧洲联盟(EU)指令中定义的监管框架可能不足以确保有效和广泛的竞争。但欧盟指令宣布铁路属于自然垄断,并采取了与运输活动垂直分离的结构性措施。行为义务也以访问义务的形式强加给基础设施管理人员。竞争网络之间没有不对称的空间,因为轨道是一种自然垄断。此外,由于进入条件是由非歧视原则决定的,因此似乎不可能引入有利于新来者的不对称,例如,以低于向现有铁路企业收取的价格的进入费用的形式。对于其余的铁路资产,只有在例外情况下才能被视为基本设施,欧盟指令要么不规定准入义务(铁路车辆、司机、票务系统),要么规定准入义务(维护设施),不存在正式的不对称,因为所有企业都必须遵守相同的准入义务。考虑引入不对称准入义务的国家监管当局应考虑描述不对称如何吸引低效市场进入的经济学文献,并应考虑在国家一级引入的义务可能使欧洲单一铁路区分裂。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Asymmetric regulation for competition in European railways?
There is an increasing number of voices calling for asymmetric regulation to reinforce competition in European railways as they are liberalized in December 2020. The regulatory framework defined in the Directives of the European Union (EU) might be insufficient to ensure effective and widespread competition. But the EU Directive declares tracks a natural monopoly, and structural measures in the form of vertical separation with transport activities have been imposed. Behavioral obligations have also been imposed on infrastructure managers in the form of access obligations. There is no room for asymmetry between competing networks, as tracks are a natural monopoly. Furthermore, as access conditions are ruled by the principle of nondiscrimination, it does not seem possible to introduce asymmetries in favor of newcomers, for instance in the form of access charges below the price charged to incumbent railway undertakings. For the rest of railway assets, which only exceptionally can be considered essential facilities, the EU Directives either impose no access obligations (rolling stock, drivers, ticketing systems) or when they impose access obligations (maintenance facilities), there is no formal asymmetry, as all undertakings are subject to the same access obligations. National regulatory authorities considering the introduction of asymmetric access obligations should take into account economic literature describing how asymmetries attract inefficient market entry, and they should consider that obligations introduced at a national level might fragment the Single European Railway Area.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries Business, Management and Accounting-Business, Management and Accounting (all)
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
14
期刊最新文献
Regulatory lag, efficiency, and performance. Lessons from a case study Legal and ownership unbundling in the Turkish natural gas market: A comparative analysis Network utility price regulation in Australia in the pre-first world war years Experimenting with co-ownership of energy storage facilities - A case study of the Netherlands Strategic interaction between wholesale and ancillary service markets
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1