A. Calcara, A. Gilli, Mauro Gilli, Ivan Zaccagnini
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Will the Drone Always Get Through? Offensive Myths and Defensive Realities
Abstract Do emerging and disruptive technologies yield an offensive advantage? This is a question of central theoretical and substantive relevance. For the most part, however, the literature on this topic has not investigated empirically whether such technologies make attacking easier than defending, but it has largely assumed that they do. At the same time, work on the offense–defense balance has primarily focused on land conflicts, thus offering little understanding of the effect of technological change in other domains, such as the air and sea. In this article we address these gaps by investigating whether current- and next-generation drones shift the offense–defense balance toward the offense or toward offense dominance, as many assume—that is, whether drone technology can or will defeat current- and next-generation air defense systems. To answer these questions, we have explored the literature in radar engineering, electromagnetism, signal processing, and air defense operation. Our analysis challenges the existing consensus about the present and raises questions about the future. Our findings also demonstrate how important it is for the field of security studies to embrace greater interdisciplinarity in order to explore pressing policy and theoretical questions.
期刊介绍:
Security Studies publishes innovative scholarly manuscripts that make a significant contribution – whether theoretical, empirical, or both – to our understanding of international security. Studies that do not emphasize the causes and consequences of war or the sources and conditions of peace fall outside the journal’s domain. Security Studies features articles that develop, test, and debate theories of international security – that is, articles that address an important research question, display innovation in research, contribute in a novel way to a body of knowledge, and (as appropriate) demonstrate theoretical development with state-of-the art use of appropriate methodological tools. While we encourage authors to discuss the policy implications of their work, articles that are primarily policy-oriented do not fit the journal’s mission. The journal publishes articles that challenge the conventional wisdom in the area of international security studies. Security Studies includes a wide range of topics ranging from nuclear proliferation and deterrence, civil-military relations, strategic culture, ethnic conflicts and their resolution, epidemics and national security, democracy and foreign-policy decision making, developments in qualitative and multi-method research, and the future of security studies.