{"title":"检察长在宪法审查中的影响","authors":"Tanya Bagashka, L. Tiede","doi":"10.1086/712651","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"After democratic transitions, many Eastern European countries reformed their political institutions in a piecemeal fashion. Focusing on the Bulgarian Constitutional Court from 1992 to 2012 and the Soviet-style procurator general, we analyze how legal reforms operate in practice in transitional societies. Using original data, we find that judges are influenced by the powerful and unaccountable procurator general. Judges’ decisions to strike down laws also are guided by alignment with their or their appointers’ political preferences and the opinions of interested parties in amicus briefs. The study has implications about interbranch relations and the role of procurator generals in constitutional review.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/712651","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Influence of Procurator Generals in Constitutional Review\",\"authors\":\"Tanya Bagashka, L. Tiede\",\"doi\":\"10.1086/712651\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"After democratic transitions, many Eastern European countries reformed their political institutions in a piecemeal fashion. Focusing on the Bulgarian Constitutional Court from 1992 to 2012 and the Soviet-style procurator general, we analyze how legal reforms operate in practice in transitional societies. Using original data, we find that judges are influenced by the powerful and unaccountable procurator general. Judges’ decisions to strike down laws also are guided by alignment with their or their appointers’ political preferences and the opinions of interested parties in amicus briefs. The study has implications about interbranch relations and the role of procurator generals in constitutional review.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44478,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Law and Courts\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-12-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/712651\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Law and Courts\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1086/712651\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Law and Courts","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1086/712651","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Influence of Procurator Generals in Constitutional Review
After democratic transitions, many Eastern European countries reformed their political institutions in a piecemeal fashion. Focusing on the Bulgarian Constitutional Court from 1992 to 2012 and the Soviet-style procurator general, we analyze how legal reforms operate in practice in transitional societies. Using original data, we find that judges are influenced by the powerful and unaccountable procurator general. Judges’ decisions to strike down laws also are guided by alignment with their or their appointers’ political preferences and the opinions of interested parties in amicus briefs. The study has implications about interbranch relations and the role of procurator generals in constitutional review.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
分享
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
