{"title":"地区议会和行政机关，地区当局，以及选举专制国家对地区选举的战略操纵","authors":"A. Schakel, Valentyna Romanova","doi":"10.1080/13597566.2022.2103546","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this introduction, we set out to analyse the relationship between regional elections and regional authority and the extent to which regional elections are held free and fair. We hypothesize that the incentives to interfere increase when regions exercise more authority but the possibilities to interfere decline when the regional executive is elected. A quantitative analysis confirms that directly elected and stronger regional bodies make them more attractive for central meddling, but the presence of elected executives makes central interference less likely. We zoom-in on nine electoral autocracies that have featured in the past five annual reviews of regional elections to explore how regional elections become less free and fair. We identify six strategies to manipulate regional elections which are applied in at least two electoral autocracies: simultaneity between regional and national elections, limiting party entry, gerrymandering, nationalizing regional election campaigns, party switching, and centralization of authority.","PeriodicalId":46657,"journal":{"name":"Regional and Federal Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2022-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Regional assemblies and executives, regional authority, and the strategic manipulation of regional elections in electoral autocracies\",\"authors\":\"A. Schakel, Valentyna Romanova\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/13597566.2022.2103546\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT In this introduction, we set out to analyse the relationship between regional elections and regional authority and the extent to which regional elections are held free and fair. We hypothesize that the incentives to interfere increase when regions exercise more authority but the possibilities to interfere decline when the regional executive is elected. A quantitative analysis confirms that directly elected and stronger regional bodies make them more attractive for central meddling, but the presence of elected executives makes central interference less likely. We zoom-in on nine electoral autocracies that have featured in the past five annual reviews of regional elections to explore how regional elections become less free and fair. We identify six strategies to manipulate regional elections which are applied in at least two electoral autocracies: simultaneity between regional and national elections, limiting party entry, gerrymandering, nationalizing regional election campaigns, party switching, and centralization of authority.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46657,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Regional and Federal Studies\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-07-30\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Regional and Federal Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2022.2103546\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Regional and Federal Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2022.2103546","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Regional assemblies and executives, regional authority, and the strategic manipulation of regional elections in electoral autocracies
ABSTRACT In this introduction, we set out to analyse the relationship between regional elections and regional authority and the extent to which regional elections are held free and fair. We hypothesize that the incentives to interfere increase when regions exercise more authority but the possibilities to interfere decline when the regional executive is elected. A quantitative analysis confirms that directly elected and stronger regional bodies make them more attractive for central meddling, but the presence of elected executives makes central interference less likely. We zoom-in on nine electoral autocracies that have featured in the past five annual reviews of regional elections to explore how regional elections become less free and fair. We identify six strategies to manipulate regional elections which are applied in at least two electoral autocracies: simultaneity between regional and national elections, limiting party entry, gerrymandering, nationalizing regional election campaigns, party switching, and centralization of authority.
期刊介绍：
The upsurge of academic and political interest in regional and federal questions since the 1980s has been stimulated by the salience of regions in EU policy-making and the Structural Funds but also by regionalization and federalization processes in many Western states. The most striking example is the devolution occurring in the UK, but the process is at work all over Europe and in other parts of the world. These developments have led to many important research programmes and projects. Regional and Federal Studies is a refereed social science journal which provides an academic forum for the publication of international research on these issues. It is essential reading for both academics and practitioners in politics, administration and the business world.
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