前景功利主义与原点

IF 0.8 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-11-03 DOI:10.1017/apa.2022.31
Hun Chung
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引用次数: 1

摘要

假设处于原始立场的双方将卡尼曼和特沃斯基的前景理论作为他们通过无知之幕幸存下来的人类心理学的一般知识。这将如何改变原位置的选择情况?在本文中,我提出了我所谓的“前景功利主义”。前景功利主义将以卡纳曼和特沃斯基的前景理论为代表的功利主义社会福利函数与个人效用函数相结合。我认为,一旦前景功利主义被摆上台面,罗尔斯最初支持正义即公平的论点,以及他反对功利主义的论点,充其量都是不确定的。这表明,在最初的立场上,功利主义的选择有多不可信,在很大程度上取决于人们对最初的缔约双方所知道的人类心理学的一般知识的假设。
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Prospect Utilitarianism and the Original Position
Suppose we assume that the parties in the original position took Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory as constituting their general knowledge of human psychology that survives through the veil of ignorance. How would this change the choice situation of the original position? In this paper, I present what I call ‘prospect utilitarianism’. Prospect utilitarianism combines the utilitarian social welfare function with individual utility functions characterized by Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory. I will argue that, once prospect utilitarianism is on the table, Rawls's original arguments in support of justice as fairness as well as his arguments against utilitarianism are, at best, inconclusive. This shows that how implausible a choice for utilitarianism in the original position is heavily depends on what one assumes to be general knowledge of human psychology that the original contracting parties know.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
10.00%
发文量
73
期刊介绍: Appearing quarterly in print and online, the Journal of the American Philosophical Association provides a platform for original work in all areas of philosophy. The Journal aims to publish compelling papers written in a way that can be appreciated by philosophers of every persuasion and to review papers quickly (typically within 30 days of submission) and fairly (using a triple anonymous review system), encouraging succinct, constructive reports. Papers are published online early via FirstView (typically within 8 weeks of acceptance).
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