审计师对管理层信心和错报风险的回应

IF 3.6 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Accounting Organizations and Society Pub Date : 2022-08-01 DOI:10.1016/j.aos.2022.101348
Sanaz Aghazadeh , Jennifer R. Joe
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引用次数: 1

摘要

公司管理者表现出不同程度的信心,但投资者似乎很难区分管理层的高度信心何时是有保证的(即,当它预示着准确性和/或未来的积极结果时)。档案研究发现,与高自信代理相关的经理实际上是“过度自信”,因为他们的选择最终平均导致个人和股东损失。审计人员在评估管理方面经验丰富,并受过专业怀疑的培训,用户依靠他们来减少财务报告中嘈杂信号的信息风险。因此,我们研究管理层信心是否以及如何影响审计师对重大错报风险(RMM)的反应。审计标准明确规定,随着RMM的增加,审核员应增加测试并获得更可靠的证据。因此,我们进行了一项实验,改变了管理层对客户的会计估计和RMM解释的信心。我们发现,与思想抑制文献一致,尽管审计师普遍认为在没有证实的情况下依赖管理层的解释是不合适的,高置信度表明管理层希望诱导审计师信赖,但当管理层置信度高时,他们并没有区分对RMM的反应。当管理层信心较低时,审核员适当地为RMM较高的客户执行更多的测试。当管理层信心高而不是低时,审计师的测试判断调节了他们为高风险客户而不是低风险客户寻求调查证据的可能性。我们的发现令人不安,因为欺诈的管理者很容易操纵信心,影响向审计师提供的解释和调查证据。因此,我们的研究提供了证据,证明审计师受高管理层信心影响的倾向可以在观察到的高管理层信心和有偏见的财务报告之间的关联中发挥促进作用。
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Auditors' response to management confidence and misstatement risk

Corporate managers display varying degrees of confidence, but investors appear to have difficulty distinguishing when management's high confidence is warranted (i.e., when it signals accuracy and/or future positive outcomes). Archival research finds that the managers associated with proxies for high confidence are actually “overconfident” because their choices ultimately resulted in personal and shareholder losses, on average. Auditors are experienced in evaluating management and are trained to be professionally skeptical, and users rely on them to reduce the information risk around noisy signals in financial reporting. Therefore, we investigate whether and how management confidence impacts auditors' response to the risk of material misstatement (RMM). Audit standards are explicit that auditors should increase testing and acquire more reliable evidence as RMM increases. Accordingly, we conduct an experiment, varying management confidence in their explanations about an accounting estimate and RMM at the client. We find, consistent with the thought-suppression literature, that although auditors universally believe relying on management's explanations without corroboration is inappropriate and that high confidence signals management's desire to induce auditor reliance, they do not distinguish their response to RMM when management confidence is high. When management confidence is low, auditors appropriately perform more testing for clients where RMM is higher than lower. Auditors' testing judgements moderate their likelihood of pursuing inquiry evidence for higher than lower risk clients when management confidence is high versus when it was low. Our finding is troublesome because deceitful managers can readily manipulate confidence and influence the explanations and inquiry evidence presented to auditors. Thus, our research offers evidence that auditors' tendency to be influenced by high management confidence can play a contributing role in the observed association between high management confidence and biased financial reporting.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
6.40%
发文量
38
期刊介绍: Accounting, Organizations & Society is a major international journal concerned with all aspects of the relationship between accounting and human behaviour, organizational structures and processes, and the changing social and political environment of the enterprise.
期刊最新文献
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